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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 200100817-CA 
v. : 
THOMAS HOWARD SMITH, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of willful evasion of income tax, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (1995), and 
failure to file a tax return, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1101(l)(b) (1995) (R. 861-63). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly reject defendant's claim that his two 
convictions should have merged where the two offenses were based on different 
conduct? 
Because the claim was not properly preserved for appellate review, there is no 
standard of review to apply. 
2. Did the trial court properly refuse to give the jury a separate instruction 
on defendant's "good faith" defense where the evidence belied defendant's "good 
faith," and the instructions given adequately instructed the jury on the State's 
burden of proof? 
Whether a trial court erred in refusing to give a proposed jury instruction is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, f 11,17 
P.3d 1153. However, jury instructions regarding a good faith defense are surplusage and 
refusal to give them is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at ^  21 
(*"[W]e commend to the district judges in the exercise of their discretion [the good faith 
instruction's] use as a supplement to the knowing and willful charge in future cases/" 
(quoting United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097,1103 (3rd Cir. 1992) (alteration in 
original)). 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support both convictions? 
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, defendant must '"marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Silva9 2000 UT App 
292, f 25,13 P.3d 604 (quoting State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, f 18, 3 P.3d 192) 
(additional quotations omitted); see also State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998). 
Evidence is sufficient if "'the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn 
2 
from it [establish that] some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that 
the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Stringham, 2001 
UT App 13, at f 26 (quoting State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, f 8, 988 P.2d 949, 
cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000)) (additional quotations omitted). 
4. Did the trial court retain jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution 
against defendant? 
Whether or not a court has jurisdiction is a question of law which this Court 
reviews without deference to the trial court. Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 
2000 UT App 110,18,2 P.3d 451. 
5. Should this Court review defendant's claim that he is entitled to a hearing 
regarding the imposition of restitution where he did not request a hearing from the 
court below and, in fact, expressly waived his right to a hearing? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999), and Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1995). 
The following relevant rules and statutes are reproduced in Addendum E: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 2; Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 59; Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2001); 
Utah R. App. P. 4. 
The following relevant statute is reproduced in Addendum F: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301 (Supp. 2001). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant was charged by information with one count of failing to file a tax 
return, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(b) (1995), 
and one count of willful evasion of income tax, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (1995) (R. 1-3). Both charges concerned only the 
1995 tax year (R. 1-3). At a preliminary hearing, defendant asked to be allowed to 
represent himself (R. 193-94). The court acquiesced after conducting an extensive 
colloquy with defendant to insure that he understood his rights and the risks involved in 
self-representation (R. 194). The court also appointed standby counsel (R. 193). 
After a three-day trial, a jury convicted defendant on both counts (R. 589-90). The 
court entered judgment on September 7,2001, and sentenced defendant to concurrent 
prison terms of zero-to-five years for Count I, and one-to-fifteen years for Count II, as 
well as imposing respective fines of $1000 and $2500 (R. 861-62; R. 959:22-23). The 
court suspended the prison terms, placed defendant on probation, and ordered him to 
cooperate with the Utah State Tax Commission ["Tax Commission"] and to file tax 
returns for all years requested (R. 861). Defendant filed a timely appeal pro se (R. 859). 
A few days later counsel for defendant filed a motion to strike defendant's pro se 
appeal (R. 866). Defendant filed a second timely notice of appeal from the September 7th 
sentencing order on September 25,2001 (R. 888). On September 21, 2001, the State filed 
lThis case has a ler *hy procedural history given the large number of pro se filings 
made below. This brief re . ences only those events which are pertinent to the appeal. 
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a Motion to Clarify the Sentencing Order in which it requested inter alia that the court 
impose $6,105.94 in restitution (R. 881-83). The court entered a restitution order on 
September 26, 2001 (R. 896-97). Defendant filed an objection to the restitution order on 
September 28, 2001 (R. 898-908). Counsel for defendant filed an appeal from the 
September 26 order on October 22, 2001 (R. 923). Both appeals were consolidated by 
order of this Court dated August 21, 2002.2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant's income and personal expenses in 1995 
In 1995, defendant operated a business from his home providing clients with tax 
assistance, bankruptcy kits, and legal research (R. 934:69-72, 87-89; R. 935:129, 131, 
147-51, 153-55,251-52). Defendant used an office in his home to receive clients and 
prepare their tax paperwork (R. 934:69-73,92-94; R. 935:129,131-32,137-38,153). 
Clients usually paid defendant for his services by check made payable to the F. O. I. A. 
Research Center, the Citizen's Legal Library Trust, or John Haas Burrell, and defendant 
deposited the money into the corresponding bank account (R. 934:81,90; R. 935:252, 
279; State's Ex. No. 8). Occasionally, payments were made payable directly to defendant 
and deposited into one of the three accounts (R. 935:282; State's Ex. No. 8). 
2Prior to consolidation of the appeals, defendant filed an opening brief in each 
appeal. The State responds to both briefs, citing to them herein as "Br. 1 of Aplt." 
(originally case no. 20010817-CA) and "Br. 2 of Aplt" (originally case no. 20010856). 
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Defendant was the sole signatory on the bank account for John Haas Burrell, and 
was a co-signatory on the other two accounts (R. 935:202-03; State's Ex. Nos. 7, 9, 10).3 
The other co-signatory on the latter two accounts was Darwin Mertin (R. 935:195, 201). 
Mr. Mertin is defendant's cousin and personal assistant and helped defendant with the 
operation of defendant's business; however, defendant was in charge of and managed the 
business (R. 935:153, 155, 160). 
In 1998 bankruptcy proceedings unrelated to this appeal, defendant claimed that 
his 1995 income from employment or operation of a business was $10,500 (R. 935:299). 
However, the total deposits into the three bank accounts in 1995 was $66,862.58 (R. 
935:289). 
In 1992, defendant purchased a mobile home on contract (R. 935:123-24). 
Defendant stated that in 1995, the balance on the mortgage was $7500 (R. 935:302). In 
1995, defendant paid the balance on the mortgage and rent for space in a mobile home 
park with checks drawn on the F.O.I.A. Research Center bank account (R. 935:133-34; 
State's Ex. Nos, 3, 8). Defendant also paid his 1995 water and electricity bills, as well as 
other utilities connected to his home, using checks drawn on the F.Oi.A. Research Center 
3
 Defendant signed the signature card on the John Haas Burrell account as "Thomas 
Smith as custodian for John Haas Burrell" (R. 935:201). Defendant claimed that Mr. 
Burrell is a friend of his who is in prison in Tennessee, and that Mr. Burrell asked 
defendant to set up a checking account undfcr Mr. Burrell's name and social security 
number to facilitate disbursement of a monthly income check (R. 936:506-07). Mr. 
Burrell allegedly authorized defendant to use the funds personally in exchange for 
defendant's services to Mr. Burrell (id.). 
6 
account (R. 935:135-36; State's Ex. No. 8). Defendant's daughter received orthodontic 
treatment in 1995 from Dr. Charles Jackson (R. 935:175). Dr. Jackson's records 
indicated that defendant was responsible for his daughter's orthodontic bills, that those 
bills were paid regularly in 1995, and that at least one check was from the Burrell account 
(R. 935:175,179; R. 936:499; State's Ex. No. 4). Defendant also drew checks from the 
three business accounts to pay personal grocery bills at Ream's, Dan's Food, and Smith's 
grocery stores (R. 935:258). 
Investigations bv the Utah State Tax Commission 
Defendant stopped filing tax returns with the Utah State Tax Commission in 1987 
(R. 935:278). The Commission performed non-filing audits on defendant for the years 
1993-1995 (R. 935:221-22). Defendant petitioned for a redetermination of the tax 
assessed against him for those years, but he never appeared for the hearing and a default 
order was entered against him (R. 935:223). 
The Tax Commission's criminal division began investigating defendant in 1999 
(R. 935:276). The investigator, Dorothy Akins, determined from bank records that 
defendant was running a business from his home and paying his personal expenses with 
the business income from bank accounts in the names of F.O.I. A. Research Center, the 
Citizen's Legal Library Trust, and John Haas Burrell (R. 935:276,279-81, 285-86). 
Akins determined from the deposits that his gross income for 1995 was $66,862.58 (R. 
935:289). She subtracted non-income transactions totaling $5,628.95 to arrive at an 
7 
adjusted gross income of $61,233.63 (R. 935:290).4 Akins then used defendant's adjusted 
gross income, marital status, and number of dependants to determine that defendant's 
taxable income for 1995 was $45,308.65 (R. 935:292-94). The Tax Commission's 
estimate of defendant's taxable income did not include deductions for business or other 
deductible expenses because defendant did not file a tax return or appear for a 
redetermination hearing, leaving the Commission with no information on deductions (R. 
935:309, 323). Defendant admits he did not file a tax return or pay income taxes for 1995 
(R. 935:302, 338, 366; R. 936:504). The State then filed this case (R. 1-2). 
Defendant's unique views of tax law 
Defendant began studying tax law on his own in 1993 (R. 936:492). He read 
several books, read the Internal Revenue Code and Title 59 of the Utah Code, and joined 
an organization purporting to provide research on tax laws (R. 443-75). Defendant 
concluded that he was not "a person who's required to file a tax return" because he could 
not find in the Internal Revenue Code the "exact specific statute that requires a person to 
file an income tax return and pay a tax" (R. 936:446,448). Defendant also believed that 
if no federal tax return is required, then no State return need be filed (R. 964:12-13). 
Before 1995, defendant had asserted his tax theories numerous times before 
administrative law judges for the Tax Commission on behalf of individuals who chose not 
4Non-income transactions are transactions that are not attributable to defendant as 
income for tax purposes, such as transfers between bank accounts, bank charges, and 
money paid to anyone other than defendant (R. 935:290). 
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to file valid tax returns in reliance on defendant's theories (R. 935:223; R. 936:483-84, 
495-96). At those hearings, and in subsequent decision letters sent to defendant, the civil 
tax division and the administrative law judges rejected defendant's arguments and 
instructed defendant on correct principles of tax law (R. 935:226-27; R. 936:483-84). On 
at least three other occasions, defendant appeared before Judge Dee Benson of the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah on tax-related matters (R. 936:489-90, 492-
99). Judge Benson heard and rejected defendant's theories (R. 936:489-91). At one 
point, Judge Benson explained, "[Y]ou have made some of the most asinine arguments 
I've ever heard as a federal judge and I don't know if you think they are cute or smart or 
talented, I don't know; but they have so little merit, so little credibility" (R. 936:491). 
Defendant admitted that his theories differ from the conclusions of judges he has 
appeared before and that he does not understand tax law as well as they do (R. 936:484). 
Defendant's novel tax theories did not comport with those of his appointed counsel 
(R. 68-69). Specifically, defendant sought new counsel below because "[counsel]... is 
of the opinion and belief that if one has income one is required to file a tax returnf,]" 
making counsel biased in favor of the prosecution and preventing him from providing a 
vigorous defense (id). The court denied defendant's request for new counsel but 
permitted defendant to proceed pro se with standby counsel (R. 79, 194). 
Five different times before trial, defendant attempted to use his tax theories to 
summarily dispose of the prosecution by filing various motions, including: three motions 
to dismiss, one Summary Motion & Memorandum to Dismiss Ex Parte, and one Request 
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for Declaratory Judgement, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 51-63, 292-314, 
325-29,413-19). Defendant's grounds for dismissal included: 1) the Tax Commission 
denied him an administrative hearing regarding the audit;5 2) defendant was not required 
to file a federal tax return and therefore was not required to file a state tax return; 3) the 
state court usurped the jurisdiction of a federal court; and 4) the Sixteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution did not permit states to tax "anything, anywhere, anytime" 
(R. 51-63,292-314, 325-29,413-19). When the court denied defendant's motions, 
defendant attempted to remove the case to federal court, arguing that the case turned on 
whether he was required to file a federal return, which, in his view, was a federal question 
(R. 431-36). The federal court summarily referred the matter back to the state court (R. 
437-38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: This Court should refuse to reach the merits of defendant's claim that 
his convictions should have merged because he did not properly raise it below. 
Defendant argued pretrial that the two charges merged; he never argued that the two 
convictions merged- The merger doctrine has no application to mere charges, and the trial 
court was not asked to review the issue following defendant's conviction. Further, 
defendant presents no plain error or exceptional circumstances argument on appeal. 
5Mericia Milligan, an auditor for the Tax Commission, testified that defendant 
requested a redetermination hearing for his tax assessment but that he failed to appear on 
the scheduled date (R. 935:223). 
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Even on the merits, the claim fails. Defendant claims that his two convictions 
should merge because the offenses share a lesser-included relationship and because they 
arise from a single criminal episode. However, he fails to recognize that his convictions 
rest on distinct conduct separated by time and intervening circumstances. His active 
concealment of his income, which formed the basis of his subsection (c) convictions, is 
not an element of the subsection (b) conviction. Likewise, the failure to file a tax return 
under subsection (b) is irrelevant to his conviction under subsection (c). Hence, the 
convictions required proof of different elements in this case, and merger is not 
appropriate. 
POINT II: The absence of a jury instruction explaining that defendant may have 
harbored a "good faith" misunderstanding of the law which led him to believe he did not 
have to file a tax return in 1995 does not undermine defendant's convictions. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, no such instruction is mandated. Moreover, such an instruction is 
unnecessary where, as here, the other instructions on willfulness adequately explained the 
State's burden of proof as to the elements of the crimes. Finally, the evidence belies any 
such good faith belief on defendant's part where he had advanced his position on the tax 
laws repeatedly before administrative law judges for the Utah State Tax Commission and 
at least one federal judge, only to have his position wholly rejected. Further, his own 
research materials contain a copy of a Utah Supreme Court case from 1992 which flatly 
rejects defendant's primary defense. His irrational refusal to accept the repeated 
rejections of his position prevents any finding of a "good faith" misunderstanding. 
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POINT HI: Defendant's pro se claim of insufficient evidence is frivolous. He 
argues that both his convictions are based on insufficient evidence because there was no 
proof that he was required to file a federal tax return for 1995, which requirement he 
claims is a necessary prerequisite to the State tax charges against him. No such proof is 
required for either conviction. 
POINT IV: The trial court retained jurisdiction to order defendant to pay 
restitution. Where a defendant's crimes have resulted in pecuniary damages, the court 
must impose restitution, but may defer setting the amount where "the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process . . . substantially outweighs the need to provide 
restitution to the victim/9 In this case, the district court's failure to impose restitution at 
the time of sentencing may be reasonably viewed as a deferral in setting restitution, 
permitting the court to wait until defendant complied with the sentencing requirement of 
filing the necessary information with the Tax Commission from which to derive a sum 
certain. In the alternative, the State's motion was a timely rule 59(e) motion to amend the 
judgment that tolled the time for filing an appeal, and the district court therefore had 
jurisdiction to rule on the motion. 
POINT V: This Court should reject defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial 
court erroneously denied him a restitution hearing because defendant did not request a 
hearing below, did not challenge the imposition of restitution, expressly waived his right 
to a hearing, and, in any event, invited any error found to exist. Defendant has waived his 
claim that the trial court failed to include specific findings in support of the restitution 
12 




MERGER IS NOT PROPER UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS WERE BASED ON 
INDEPENDENT ACTS, AND PROOF OF ONE OFFENSE WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO CONVICT ON THE OTHER 
Defendant claims that his two tax-related convictions should have merged under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1995). Br. 1 of Aplt. at 8. Specifically, he claims that 
subsections (b) and (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1) "proscribe essentially the same 
conduct" and that defendant's failure to file his 1995 tax return and his failure to pay tax 
that year was part of a single criminal episode which should result in a single conviction. 
Br. 1 of Aplt. at 8, 11-23. 
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, he waived the issue by failing to 
properly raise it below. Second, his convictions do not merge because the variations of 
the crimes established in this case have unique elements and therefore do not have a 
lesser-included offense relationship. 
A. This Court should refuse to reach the merits of defendant's claim because he 
did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346. "This rule applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions " Id. The Utah Supreme Court has 
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reaffirmed that principle in the context of a merger claim. See State v. Finlay son, 2000 
UT 10 H[ 8-10, 994 P.2d 1243 ("Finlayson IF) (finding that the court of appeals had 
incorrectly reached a merger claim raised for the first time on appeal under rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; the Court then reached the issued under ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
Defendant represented himself at trial with court-appointed standby counsel (R. 
194). At a recess during the presentation of defendant's case-in-chief, defendant made a 
"Motion to Dismiss Multiplicious [sic] Charge in Amended Information" (R. 595-602; R. 
936:509-31) (supporting memorandum is in Add. B). He claims that this motion 
preserved his merger claim for appeal. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 3-4. Defendant claimed in the 
motion that both counts charged the same conduct and that the separate subsections of the 
statute existed only to increase the State's chances of convicting defendant (R. 936:528-
29). He supported the motion with several cases from the Fifth Circuit and one case from 
Utah's Eighth Judicial District Court (R. 603-19; R. 936:510, 512). The State responded 
that the motion should be denied because it was made after the motion deadline, Fifth 
Circuit decisions are not binding on Utah courts, and the statutes have separate elements, 
separate penalties, and cover separate conduct (R. 936:509-12). The trial court denied the 
motion, ruling that the State had properly charged two separate counts (R. 936:529) (in 
Add. B). 
Setting aside the issue of whether defendant's claim of multiplicity permitted the 
trial court to adequately consider the doctrine of merger, defendant's claim is nevertheless 
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unpreserved because it was made pre-conviction. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, <[ 
17,n.3,26P.3d223. 
In Hawatmeh, the Court was presented with the State's interlocutory appeal from 
the trial court's refusal to bind multiple defendants over on the charge of aggravated 
kidnaping. Id. at % 1. The State had charged defendants with both aggravated kidnaping 
and assault, and the trial court refused to bind them over on the aggravated kidnaping 
charge because the kidnaping was incidental to the assault and thus merged with the 
underlying assault. Id. at f 17, n.3. In reversing the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that the merger doctrine did not apply because the matter involved "charges" 
instead of "convictions." Id. The clear implication from the Court's note is that a trial 
court cannot properly consider the issue of merger until after a jury has rendered its 
verdict and defendant is subject to multiple convictions for the same criminal act. See 
also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) (1999) (providing that it is the "acquittal or 
conviction and sentence" under one provision of the code that "bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision"). 
Moreover, defendant does not argue that his merger claim is reviewable under 
either plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court should therefore decline 
to address this issue. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ | 11; State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1225, 
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review issue not raised below when appellant did not 
argue either plain error or exceptional circumstances). 
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B. Defendant's claim fails on the merits because under the facts in this case the 
offenses are not included offenses, rendering merger inapplicable. 
Even if this Court reaches the merger issue, it will find that defendant's argument 
lacks merit. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (in Add. A) bars conviction for two 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode when one is a lesser included offense of 
the other. See also State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1995). 
Merger is proper if a defendant is convicted of both a charged offense and a lesser 
included offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999) (in Add. A). The Utah Supreme 
Court has adopted a two-step analysis to determine whether two offenses have the 
relationship of greater and lesser included offenses for purposes of merger under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96,97 
(Utah 1983). "[T|he first step is a purely theoretical comparison of the statutory elements 
of each offense." Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. When examining the 
elements, an offense is viewed as a lesser included offense when: "(a) It is established by 
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense 
charged . . . . " Utah Code Ann. 76-1-402(3); see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299 (1932); McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235-36; State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,121, 
42 P.3d 1248. 
Some criminal statutes, however, have multiple variations or elements, so that a 
greater-lesser relationship may exist between some variations of the crimes, but not 
others. Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861; Hill, 674 P.2d at 98. In such a case, the court must look 
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to the evidence presented at trial to determine what variation of the crime or crimes was 
proved and then "look[] to the statutory elements of the crime to determine whether it is 
an included offense." Finlay son II, 2000 UT 10, at \ 16. Accord Brooks, 908 P.2d at 
861-62; Hill, 674 P.2d at 97; State v. Pierson, 2000 UT App 274, % 12, 12 P.3d 103. The 
court need reach this step, however, only if, after comparing the statutory elements, it 
cannot "categorically say that [the crimes] will never have a lesser included relationship." 
Brooks, 908 P.2d at 861-62. 
1. Subsections (b) and (c) of section 76-8-1101(1) mav be established bv 
proof of different facts. 
A review of the language of subsections (b) and (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1101(1) (1995) demonstrates that the offenses have common elements that could permit 
the same conduct to constitute a chargeable offense under both subsections. 
A person violates subsection (b) if: 
1) they fail to file a tax return or file a false return; 
2) with the intent to evade 
a) any tax; 
b) any requirement of Title 59; or 
c) any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) (in Add. A). 
A person violates subsection (c) if they "willfully attempt to evade or defeat any 
tax or the payment thereof " Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(c) (in Add. A). 
A comparison of the elements of these statutes establishes that each subsection 
could be violated by the willful failure to file a tax return to avoid paying taxes. 
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However, each statute may be violated in more than one way, requiring that this Court 
reach the second step of the merger analysis. Under that analysis, it becomes clear that 
the offenses, as established in this case, do not share a lesser-included relationship. 
Defendant was charged and convicted under subsection (b) for his willful failure to 
file his 1995 tax return in order to avoid payment of taxes owed for that year (R. 359-63). 
However, he was charged and convicted under subsection (c) for his repeated willful 
attempts to hide his income from the Tax Commission and avoid paying taxes by 
depositing it in several bank accounts from which he paid his personal expenses (id.). 
The distinction between the charges was made clear by the prosecutor in the bill of 
particulars as well as throughout the trial and in closing argument (R. 359-63; R. 934:81, 
90; R. 935:202-03,252,279,282; R. 965:28-30; State's Ex. Nos. 7-10).6 
As proved at trial, these offenses share a common intent and tax year. However, 
defendant's act of failing to file his tax return under subsection (b) is an element not 
required for the variation of willful evasion under subsection (c) that was proved at trial. 
6During closing arguments, after discussing defendant's failure to file an income 
tax return, the prosecutor said the following (R. 965:30): 
Count 2, the willful evasion of taxes. That he willfully attempted to evade or 
defeat a tax, again, we're talking about income tax, but that's different and 
it's not just filing. That's all this. The Citizen Legal Library, F.I.O.A., John 
Berrellfsic], Dr. Sines, people coming and going from the house. I don't 
believe in paying taxes. If I do things a certain way, they're going to tax me 
on it. Separate lines, all that sort of thing. 
That's-ultimately, those are the acts of willfully evading. 
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On the other hand, the offense of failure to file a tax return under subsection (b) cannot be 
established by proof that a defendant put his income in bank accounts purportedly 
belonging to others throughout the course of the tax year at issue. Thus, proof of the 
offense of failure to file a tax return does not prove all the elements required for the 
variation of evasion of taxes relevant to this case and vice versa. Accordingly, the 
variations of these two crimes established in this case do not share a lesser-included 
relationship as each possesses a unique element. See Brooks, 908 P.2d at 862. 
Because willful evasion of taxes and failure to file a tax return under the facts in 
this case do not stand in a lesser-included relationship, the two crimes do not merge under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). 
2, This Court does not need to look outside the state of Utah to resolve 
the issue. 
Defendant goes beyond the plain language of the statute and the facts of this case, 
arguing that this Court should adopt the federal interpretation of similarly worded 
criminal statutes because Title 59 was enacted to conform Utah's administration of its 
income tax laws and the requisite rules of procedure with the federal system. Br. 1 of 
Aplt. at 17-21. The federal interpretation, he claims, would result in application of the 
merger doctrine. Id. This Court should decline to consider defendant's analysis because 
defendant provides no reason for the Court to adopt the non-binding decisions of various 
federal appellate courts when Utah has an ample, readily-available, controlling body of 
statutes and case law concerning merger. 
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However, even when considered under federal law, as defendant advocates, the 
facts under this case do not warrant merger. Federal courts follow the same test under 
Blockburger as does the state of Utah. See subpoint B, supra. Under federal law, the 
merger of offenses is fact sensitive, and two offenses may enjoy an included-offense 
relationship under one set of facts but not under another. See United States v. Kaiser, 893 
F.2d 1300, 1304 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that Court follows Blockburger rule that 
determines, absent specific statutory authorization of cumulative punishment, whether 
"offenses are sufficiently distinguishable to permit the imposition of cumulative 
punishment"); United States v. Buckley, 586 F.2d 498, 504 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that 
convictions for tax evasion and failure to file a return must merge where government 
relies on failure to file tax return as basis for both offenses); United States v. Reynolds, 
288 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1961) ("Congress did not intend that an attempt to evade the tax 
would necessarily merge in the offense of failing to pay the tax."). 
The federal equivalents of sections 76-8-1101(b) and 76-8-1101(c) are 26 
U.S.C.A. §§ 7203 and 7201 (Supp. 2001), respectively (in Add. A).7 Under the federal 
scheme, section 7203 may be viewed as a lesser included offense of section 7201. See 
United States v. Doyle, 956 F.2d 73,75 (5th Cir. 1992). Section 7203 is a misdemeanor 
offense and only punishes u<[w]illful but passive neglect of the statutory duty," i.e., 
crimes such as willfully failing to file a return or willfully failing to pay taxes. Id. 
726 U.S.C.A. § 7203 has not been amended since 1990. 
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(quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 498-99 (1943)). Section 7201 is a felony 
offense that punishes ";a willful and positive attempt to evade tax '" Id. (quoting 
Spies, 317 U.S. at 498-99). 
Defendant correctly asserts that under federal law, a person cannot be convicted of 
both felony income tax evasion and misdemeanor failure to file an income tax return 
when the only criminal act supporting the convictions is the willful failure to file a tax 
return. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 17-21. But those are not the facts at hand. Defendant's 
convictions rest on two criminal acts: 1) failing to file a tax return; and 2) hiding income 
in various trust accounts in order to avoid paying taxes on that income. Under the federal 
scheme, defendant's act of hiding income would be an affirmative act punishable under 
26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 (see United States v. Carlson, 235 F.3d 466,468-69 (9th Cir. 2000)), 
and defendant's act of failing to file a tax return would be a separate misdemeanor 
punishable under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7203 (see Doyle, 956 F.2d at 75). Hence, defendant's 
reliance on federal law is not only unnecessary in this case, but would result in affirmance 
of his convictions. 
£a Defendant was not convicted twice for the same act occurring in a single 
criminal episode. 
Defendant contends that he is entitled to have one of his convictions vacated on the 
ground that his conduct "supported a single plan that should have been charged as a 
single offense." Br. 1 of Aplt. at 23. He argues that under the single criminal episode 
doctrine set forth in section 76-1-402(1), the conduct upon which both of his convictions 
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were based—failure to file a tax return or to pay taxes—was part of a single objective or 
event and warranted only one conviction. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 22-23. However, defendant 
again fails to take into account the actual evidence upon which his convictions were based 
and the fact that his two convictions stemmed from different conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) provides that if "the same act of a defendant under 
a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different 
ways under different provisions of [the] code," and defendant is prosecuted and convicted 
under multiple provisions of the code for that act, then "the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision " Add. A. In other words, a defendant may be prosecuted 
and punished for all crimes committed within a single criminal episode so long as they 
each arise from separate acts. See State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896,900 (Utah 1986) 
(referring to the first paragraph of the statute). 
Defendant argues that tax evasion under both subsections "could be accomplished 
by failing to file a return, or filing a fraudulent return" and that, "[i]n this case, [he] 
allegedly evaded the tax by failing to file a return." Br. 1 of Aplt. at 23. Defendant again 
ignores the fact that the conviction under subsection (c) was based on conduct not 
necessary to his conviction under subsection (b) and vice versa. See subsection Bl, 
supra. Further, the conduct charged and proven by the State which formed the basis of 
the two convictions was separated by time and intervening circumstances. The 
conviction under subsection (c) was based on deposits into and withdrawals from the 
various bank accounts which occurred throughout 1995 as the income was earned and the 
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debts it paid were incurred (R. 935:133-36, 175, 179, 258; R. 936:499; State's Ex. Nos. 3, 
4, 8). The conviction under subsection (b) was based on defendant's intentional failure to 
file the appropriate return on or before the filing deadline of that year. See Br. 1 of Aplt. 
at 22. Consequently, defendant was not convicted twice for the same act, and his 
argument fails. See State v. Smathers, 602 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1979) (conduct prohibited 
under the rape statute is not conduct prohibited under the aggravated sexual assault 
statute, permitting two convictions). 
Defendant cites to State v. Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980), and State v. Crosby, 
927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), in support of his claim that the two separate convictions 
amount to a single criminal violation. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 21-22. Those cases, however, 
involved thefts committed under a continuing scheme. The Kimbel test has not been 
extended beyond theft or embezzlement cases. See State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 390 
(Utah App. 1997). In Patience, this Court refused to apply the Kimbel test to forgery 
cases even if the forgeries were committed in the course of a continuous transaction, 
holding instead that a defendant could be convicted for each document forged. Id. 
Indeed, while the Supreme Court in Crosby required the theft charges to be consolidated, 
it did not preclude the separate conviction of a single forgery charge, even though it 
appears the objective was the same, i.e., to misappropriate company funds. See Crosby, 
927 P.2d at 645-46. In short, the Kimbel test is a narrow exception to section 76-1-402. 
Defendant has not demonstrated that the exception is warranted here. 
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Because defendant's convictions were based on separate acts, defendant was 
appropriately convicted of and punished for both offenses under section 76-1-402. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402; see also O 'Brien, 721 P.2d at 900 (where aggravated 
burglary and theft were committed during a single criminal episode but were the result of 
separate and distinct acts, the acts resulted in separate and distinct crimes, and the trial 
judge was within his discretion to sentence defendants for four separate crimes); State v. 
Mane, 783 P.2d 61,66 (Utah App. 1989) (defendant's conduct during a single criminal 
episode, which encompassed four victims, consisted of separate "acts" and permitted 
conviction and punishment for each act). 
POINT B 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
THE RELEVANT LAW, AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO A SEPARATE INSTRUCTION ON "GOOD FAITH" 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to submit his proposed jury 
instruction on his defense of good faith misunderstanding of the law. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 25-
44. Defendant's good faith instruction was unnecessary because: 1) the jury instructions 
adequately instructed the jury on the State's burden to prove the elements of the crimes; 
and 2) there was no reasonable basis in the evidence for the jury to find defendant's belief 
was in good faith. 
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A. The United States Supreme Court has not mandated the giving of a "good 
faith55 instruction whenever a defendant raises a "good faith1' defense in a tax 
case. 
Defendant builds his argument around a United States Supreme Court case which 
does not support his position. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (in Add. 
C). Cheek held that a defendant is entitled to assert as a defense in a tax evasion case a 
good faith belief that the tax laws do not impose a duty on him. Id. at 206-07. Defendant 
asserts that this holding entitles him to an instruction on "good faith." Br. 1 of Aplt. at 
30, 35. In Cheek, however, the trial court issued a jury instruction on good faith, so that 
the question of whether or not a good faith instruction was required was not before the 
Court. 498 U.S. at 196-97. The question considered in Cheek was only whether the trial 
court's supplemental instructions on good faith correctly stated the law. Id. at 198-99. 
Moreover, the Cheek Court acknowledged, without criticism, its own holding in United 
States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), issued fifteen years earlier, that "after instructing 
the jury on willfulness, *[a]n additional instruction on good faith was unnecessary.'" 
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (quoting Pomponio, 429 U.S. at 12) (alteration in original). 
Consequently, Cheek does not require the giving of a "good faith" instruction in every 
case. As explained below, such an instruction was unnecessary in this case. See 
subsections B and C, infra. 
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B. Utah law does not require a good faith instruction where other instructions 
adequately instruct the iurv on the State's burden of proof as to the charged 
crimes. 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Pomponio, this Court held in State 
v. Stringham that good faith instructions are unnecessary if other instructions on 
willfulness adequately explain "the government's burden to prove the elements of the 
crime " 2001 UT App 13, f 20,17 PJd 1153. This holding is also consistent with 
the rule that '"[fjailure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only 
if their omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or 
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law.'" Summer hill v. Shipley, 890 
P.2d 1042,1044 (Utah App, 1995) (quoting Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 88 (Utah 
App. 1987)). A good faith defense serves only to contradict the State's evidence of 
willfulness and adds nothing new to the elements of the crime. Thus, where the jury is 
properly instructed on the element of willfulness, the "'good faith instruction is simply a 
redundant version of the instruction on [that] elementf].'" Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at 
1f 20 (quoting United States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097,1103 (3rd Cir. 1992)). 
The good faith instruction's propensity for redundancy has led this Court to adopt 
the more deferential "abuse of discretion" standard used by the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals for reviewing a refusal to submit a good faith instruction- See Stringham, 2001 
UT App 13, at f 21; see also Gross, 961 F.2d at 1101. "[W]e agree with the Third 
Circuit's statement in Gross that in some cases it may be appropriate to give a good faith 
instruction, but that it is 'not reversible error for the district court to refuse to give the 
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good faith instruction . . . , we commend to the district judges in the exercise of their 
discretion [the good faith instruction's] use as a supplement to the "knowing and willful" 
charge in future cases.'" Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at f 21 (quoting Gross, 961 F.2d at 
1103) (alteration in original). An appellate court will find an abuse of discretion only 
where there is no "reasonable basis in the record to support" the trial court's challenged 
ruling. See State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, f 3, 34 P.3d 790 (addressing a "good 
cause" determination under the speedy trial statute) (quoting State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 
117, 477 P.2d 147, 148 (Utah 1970)). 
In Stringham, the defendant was convicted of communications fraud and 
racketeering. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at % 1. The communications fraud statute 
under which he was convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1990), required the 
prosecution to prove that defendant's misrepresentations were made "intentionally, 
knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for the truth." Defendant appealed the 
communications fraud convictions on the ground that the trial court erred in refusing to 
submit a good faith instruction to the jury. Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at f 17. This 
Court found the jury instructions regarding the crime's mens rea element to be 
sufficiently complete so as to render a good faith instruction unnecessary. Id. at f 23. 
Those instructions included the following: I) a statement of the elements of the crime, 
including the required mental intent designated by the statute; and 2) definitions of 
"intentionally," "knowingly," and "reckless disregard for the truth" that closely tracked 
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the language of the statutory definitions in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999). 
Stringham, 2001 UT App 13, at f 22. 
In the present case, the jury instructions were more complete than the instructions 
found to be adequate in Stringham. Id. at f j 22-23. Instructions 33 and 34 explained the 
elements of each crime and the State's burden of proof (R. 584-85) (in Add. D). They 
both stated that the jury could convict defendant if it found from the evidence that "the 
State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements 
" (id.). Add. D. The instructions then listed the elements of the crimes, including 
that defendant acted "[i]ntentionally or [w]illfitlly" (id.). Add. D. Instruction 28 defined 
willfulness for the jury: "A person engages in conduct: (1) Intentionally or with intent or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result " (R. 
579) (in Add. D). 
In addition, instructions 29 and 29 A explained the purpose of the evidence 
regarding defendant's research of tax law. Instruction 29 stated, 
The defendant has introduced evidence of advice he heard given by speakers 
at meetings, tape recorded lectures, essays, pamphlets, court opinions, and 
other material that he testified he relied on in concluding that he was not a 
person required to file an income tax return for 1995. This evidence has been 
admitted solely for the purpose of aiding you in determining whether or not the 
defendant's failure to timely file a tax return for 1995 was knowing and willful 
and you should not consider it for any other purpose. 
(R. 580) (in Add. D). Instruction 29A stated, "You are instructed that the admission of 
defendant's Exhibit £23 A-W is not entered into evidence for any substantive value but 
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for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's state of mind on or about January 1, 
1995 to April 16, 1996." (R. 581) (in Add. D).8 Thus, the jury was instructed not only on 
the State's burden to prove willful intent and what willful intent meant, but also that 
defendant had submitted evidence supporting his assertion that his evasion was not 
willful. Accordingly, the jury instructions here were more complete than those upheld in 
Stringham, and a good faith instruction would have been redundant. The trial court's 
rejection of defendant's proposed instruction, therefore, did not amount to an abuse of 
discretion. 
£s Defendant was not entitled to a separate good faith instruction because there 
was no basis in the evidence for the jury to find defendant's belief was in good 
faith. 
In addition to being redundant, a good faith instruction in this case would have 
been misleading because there was no rational basis in the evidence supporting a finding 
that defendant's beliefs regarding taxes were held in good faith. 
Defendant agrees that the standard for willfulness is the "voluntary, intentional 
violation of a known legal duty." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 (cited in Br. 1 of Aplt. at 26). It 
follows that if the jury credits defendant's conduct to a good faith misunderstanding of 
the law, it must find him not guilty. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202. However, the good faith 
misunderstanding must rest on an arguable point of law. Hales Sand & Gravel Inc. v. 
Audit Division of the State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992); Chicago 
defendant's exhibit #23 A-W consisted of the numerous volumes of tax-related 
books upon which defendant claimed he relied in interpreting the tax laws. 
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Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992). 
Additionally, one who holds an erroneous but good faith understanding and then is given 
reason to doubt that understanding may longer hide behind the initial belief as a defense 
to criminal prosecution. Nelson v. State Tax Comm % 903 P.2d 939, 940 (Utah 1995) 
("Irrational and unsupported interpretations of the tax code will not justify circumvention 
of the requirement to file and pay state taxes, especially when the Commission has 
notified a resident of his or her duty to do so/'); cf. United States v. Mathes, 151 F.3d 251, 
255 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant in prosecution for failure to pay child support 
cannot assert defense of good faith misunderstanding based on advice from attorney when 
defendant later learned that attorney was unfamiliar with the laws of the state). 
Defendant testified at trial that he had read several books on the federal income tax 
system and substantial portions of both the Internal Revenue Code and Title 59 of the 
Utah Code (R. 443-75). He introduced into evidence five boxes of research material that 
he had amassed, including several books he had read, copies of the Internal Revenue 
Code for several years, and more than twenty binders of research from the "Research 
Foundation" (Defendant's Ex. Nos. 23A-23W). Defendant concluded from his research 
that he was not "a person who's required to file a tax return" because he was unable to 
find in the Internal Revenue Code the "exact specific statute that requires a person to file 
an income tax return and pay a tax" (R. 936:446,448). Defendant also asserted that he 
was not required to file a state tax return because the state return used the gross income 
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definition of the federal return, and he was not required to file a federal return (R. 964:12-
13). 
Defendant's belief that he was not required to pay taxes was not in good faith 
because he was expressly notified before 1995 that his understanding of tax law was 
erroneous. Before 1995, defendant asserted his tax theories numerous times before 
administrative law judges for the Utah State Tax Commission on behalf of individuals 
who, in reliance on defendant's theories, failed to file valid tax returns (R. 935:223; R. 
936:483-84, 495-96). On those occasions, the civil tax division and the administrative 
law judges rejected defendant's arguments and instructed defendant on tax law (R. 
935:226-27; R. 936:483-84). At least three times, defendant appeared before Judge Dee 
Benson of the United States District Court for the District of Utah on tax-related matters 
(R. 936:489-90,492-99). Judge Benson heard and rejected defendant's theories, noting 
that they were without merit or credibility (R. 936: 489-91). Thus, prior to 1995, 
defendant was repeatedly notified that his theories were wrong and that he was required 
to file a tax return. Defendant nevertheless refused to accept that fact. Moreover, he has 
given no justifiable basis for his stubborn adherence to his irrational beliefs. 
Additionally, defendant's own research materials rebut his claim of good faith. 
Defendant's exhibit number 23G is a binder on which he claims to have relied in reaching 
his conclusion that he was not required to file a tax return or pay income taxes. The 
second article in defendant's binder is a copy of Jensen v. State Tax Comm >i, 835 P.2d 
965 (Utah 1992), in which the Utah Supreme Court flatly rejects defendant's primary 
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argument: that because the federal government did not determine that he had to file a 
federal tax return, he was not obliged to file a state tax return. Id. at 969. Thus, 
defendant's own research material put him on notice that his understanding of Title 59 of 
the Utah Code was erroneous. Consequently, there was no reasonable basis in the 
evidence upon which the jury could consider a "good faith" defense. Defendant was, 
therefore, not entitled to his "good faith" instruction. See, e.g., State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 
211,214 (Utah 1985) (where there is no basis in the evidence which would provide a 
reasonable basis for the jury to find that defendant acted in self defense, no such 
instruction shall be given). 
PQINT ffl 
PROOF OF A FEDERAL DETERMINATION THAT DEFENDANT 
MUST FILE A FEDERAL TAX RETURN IS NOT REQUIRED FOR 
A CONVICTION OF FAILING TO FILE A STATE TAX RETURN 
Defendant presents the third claim on his own behalf, arguing that the evidence 
below was insufficient to support both his convictions.9 Defendant claims that before he 
9Prior to briefing this appeal, defense counsel requested that this Court permit 
defendant to file pro se appellate briefs in addition to those counsel intended to file. The 
State opposed the motion and noted that defense counsel had identified herself in this 
appeal as defendant's counsel until filing the request, at which point she identified herself 
as "standby" counsel This Court determined that "[i]f Appellant wishes to raise issues 
that [counsel] believes are meritless or otherwise unsupported, [counsel] should 
incorporate those issues into its brief under the guidelines of Anders v. California. 386 
U.S. 738 (1967) and State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981)." Order dated April 24, 
2002 (in Add. E). In so doing, the Court twice identified defense counsel as "counsel of 
record," not standby counsel. Id. Add. E. 
Counsel responded by filing an opening brief in which she repeatedly refers to 
herself as "standby counsel." Id. at cover, 1 & n.l, 3, 8-9. She also fully incorporates 
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can be convicted of either charge, the State must prove that %4a federal trier of fact" has 
determined that defendant was required to file a federal income tax return for 1995. Br. 1 
of Aplt. at 47-48. However, neither charge requires proof of such an element.10 
The assessment of a federal tax is independent of the duty to file a tax return, the 
latter of which arises upon the earning of income. Jensen v. State Tax Commission, 835 
P.2d 965, 970 (Utah 1992) ("[T]he duty to file a [tax] return arises when a person earns 
income, not when his or her income is assessed for tax purposes."); see also Nelson v. 
Auditing Div.t Utah State Tax Commission, 903 P.2d 939, 940 (Utah 1995). Regardless 
of whether the federal government assessed income taxes against defendant, the evidence 
established that in 1995, defendant earned income sufficient to require that he file a state 
tax return and pay taxes, both of which he failed to do (R. 935: 294-99; R. 936: 365-67). 
Accordingly, the absence of proof of any federal determination of the need for a federal 
tax return for 1995 is irrelevant to defendant's convictions, and his claim of insufficient 
evidence fails. See Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969-70. 
defendant's frivolous issue into the first brief, attributing the issue to defendant acting pro 
se. Br. 1 of Aplt. at 1-2 n.l, 44-48. Counsel explains that she interprets Anders as 
requiring a determination of frivolousness as it relates to the entire appeal, not to 
individual issues within an appeal. Id. at 1-2, n.l. As counsel did not believe the entire 
appeal to be "wholly frivolous," she rejected Anders as inapplicable, apparently making 
no determination as to the merit of defendant's pro se issue. Id. If that is the case, the 
defense has circumvented this Court's order denying defendant's motion to file his own 
pro se appellate briefs. 
10Defendant's argument centers around the act of filing a tax return. Br. 1 of Aplt. 
at 47-48. Because only one of his convictions was based on this act, see Point 1(B)(2), 
supra, the State addresses only that charge in its response to this argument. 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL DID NOT DEPRIVE THE 
TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION TO ENTER THE 
RESTITUTION ORDER WHERE RESTITUTION HAD BEEN 
DEFERRED AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING; FURTHER, THE 
STATE'S MOTION WAS A TIMELY 59(e) MOTION TO AMEND 
THE JUDGMENT, PRESERVING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JURISDICTION TO ORDER RESTITUTION 
Defendant alleges that the trial court did not impose restitution in its original 
judgment and that the order setting restitution at $6,105.94 was a material change in the 
judgment. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 13-16. Defendant then mistakenly claims that the State's 
motion was untimely, and that his notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction 
to amend the judgment to include restitution. Id. at 16-19. Defendant's argument first 
fails because a trial court may, as it did here, defer setting restitution. Alternatively, the 
State's motion was a timely motion to amend the sentence, tolling the time for filing an 
appeal, rendering all notices of appeal filed before September 26 of no effect, and 
permitting entry of the restitution order. 
A. The trial court intended that restitution be a part of defendant's 
probation, but properly deferred setting restitution under Utah Code 
Ann, § 77-3ga-3Q3(4)t 
The trial court did not materially change defendant's sentence by entry of the 
restitution order, but merely completed the sentence by imposing the mandatory 
restitution that had been implicitly deferred at the formal sentencing hearing. Under 
Utah's sentencing statute, the court has discretion to sentence a guilty defendant to a 
variety of punishments listed in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (1999). Restitution is set 
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apart from that selection of punishments and is mandatory. "When a defendant is 
convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any 
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution as 
provided in this subsection " Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (Supp. 2001) 
(emphasis added) (in Add. E); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (1999) (in Add. E); see 
also State v. Stirba, 972 P.2d 918, 922 (Utah App. 1998) (restitution statute makes 
restitution mandatory following a conviction); State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 
App. 1992) (stating that Utah statutes mandate court to order restitution when 
appropriate). 
A trial court need not enter a restitution order or consider restitution at the time of 
sentencing. 'The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of 
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the 
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under this subsection, 
substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim." Utah Code Ann. §§ 
77-38a-302(5)(d) & 76-3-20l(8)(d). Add. E. 
By its nature, the crime of tax evasion results in pecuniary damages and requires 
restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(a)(i). Add. E. In few cases is a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages more 
obvious than in a tax evasion case. The nature of the conviction is that defendant failed to 
remit a sum of money owed to the State of Utah. Restitution is, therefore, necessarily part 
of defendant's conviction for tax evasion. 
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In the present case, the court did not expressly order restitution at sentencing as a 
part of defendant's probation (R. 861-863). However, the implication from the 
sentencing minutes and transcript, along with the presentence report and the nature of the 
crimes, makes clear that restitution was to be imposed and would be a part of defendant's 
probation. Where the State has provided the necessary information for the court to 
consider restitution, and the nature of the crime (tax evasion) so obviously demands 
restitution, the absence of a specific restitution determination at sentencing is not a denial 
of restitution but a deferral. 
The State complied at the sentencing hearing with its statutory duty to provide the 
court with the names of the victim and the estimated restitution amount.11 The 
presentence report stated, "No restitution appears to be owing at this time, however, if the 
defendant does file an Income Tax Return for 1995, there may be an amount owed to the 
State of Utah" (R. 750:2). A letter from the prosecuting attorney was attached to the 
presentence report and stated that the Tax Commission had determined that defendant 
owed $7,162.64 in taxes, interest, and penalties for the year 1995 (R. 750:13) (in Add. E). 
The amount owed was again brought to the attention of both the court and defendant at 
11
 While information from the prosecution regarding restitution is normally framed 
as a "request" for restitution, the Crime Victims Restitution Act imposes no duty upon the 
prosecution to request restitution. The Act requires only that the prosecution provide the 
court with the names of victims and the amounts of restitution sought by those victims. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (Supp. 2001). 
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the sentencing hearing by the prosecutor when he asserted that defendant owed $6,000 as 
of August 1999 in tax, interest, and penalties for 1995 (R. 959:16). 
It is understood that the final amount owing for defendant's crimes depends on the 
information defendant was ordered to provide to the Tax Commission. The conditions of 
his probation require him to "cooperate with the Tax Commission," "file returns for all 
years requested," and "make any future filings" (R. 862). To set restitution before the 
information was submitted would be premature. It follows logically that when the court 
ordered defendant to file all his returns and cooperate with the Tax Commission, it also 
intended that he pay the delinquent taxes for which he was convicted in the amount 
ultimately determined by the Tax Commission based on all necessary information 
defendant was ordered to provide. Consequently, a subsequent order imposing 
restitution, once defendant made known his intent not to provide the necessary 
information to the Tax Commission, was a step contemplated under the sentencing and 
restitution statutes. 
B. Even assuming the State's motion is a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the 
judgment the trial court maintained jurisdiction because the motion 
was timely and thus tolled defendant's time to appeal. 
Defendant characterizes the State's motion of September 21 as a motion to amend 
the judgment filed under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e). Br. 2 of Aplt. at 8. He 
claims that the motion was untimely, robbing the trial court of jurisdiction to act on it. Id. 
at 16-18. This Court has held that the nomenclature used to designate a motion is 
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unimportant, and that it looks to the substance of the motion to determine how to treat it. 
Kunzler v. O 'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). 
Assuming arguendo that the State's motion was a Rule 59(e) motion to amend the 
judgment, defendant's claim that the motion was untimely is mistaken under the proper 
calculation of the time under Rule 2, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.12 Rule 2, which 
governs the computation of time in criminal cases, states, "When a period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal 
holidays shall not be included in the computation." Utah R. Crim. P. 2(a). The time to 
file a motion to amend the judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) is ten 
days from the date of judgment. Accordingly, the computation of the ten day period is 
ten "business days" and excludes weekends and holidays. Utah R. Crim. P. 2(a). 
The judgment of the trial court was entered on Friday, September 7,2001 (R. 861-
63). The State filed its motion asking for clarification of the sentence on Friday, 
September 21, 2001 (R. 881-83). The day judgment is entered is not included, but the last 
day of the ten day period is. Utah R. Civ. P. 2(a). Thus, starting on Monday, September 
l2Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to criminal cases pursuant to 
Rule 81, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The latter rule provides: 
These rules of procedure shall also govenr in any aspect of criminal 
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, provided, that 
any rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional 
requirement. 
UtahR. Civ. P. 81(e). 
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10 and counting forward ten days, excluding the two weekends, September 21 was the 
tenth day of the period, and the State's motion was timely. 
A timely motion under Rule 59 tolls the time for filing an appeal; a notice of 
appeal filed before entry of an order on a timely Rule 59 motion is of no effect. Utah R. 
App. P. 4(b). Therefore, even under defendant's characterization of the State's motion, 
the motion was timely filed, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider and rule on it, and 
defendant did not perfect his appeal until he filed his subsequent October 22 notice of 
appeal. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT EXPRESSLY WAIVED ANY RIGHT HE HAD TO A 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
Defendant claims that the trial court unlawfully imposed restitution without 
affording him a hearing and without making a record of its consideration of the 
defendant's financial resources, his ability to pay, and the rehabilitative effect of 
restitution on defendant. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 19-29. This Court should reject defendant's 
claim because it was not preserved for appeal, he expressly waived a hearing below, he 
invited the error in the lower court, and he establishes no entitlemeat to relief on appeal. 
A. Background 
The prosecutor filed his motion seeking a restitution order on September 21, 2001 
(R. 881-87) (in Add. F). The court entered its order establishing a restitution amount on 
September 26 (R. 896-979) (in Add. F). The order provided: 
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The defendant is hereby Ordered as follows in addition to anything 
already ordered in this case: 
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present; 
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of 
the defendant; 
(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation 
with such returns; 
4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, for purposes of 
this criminal case only, but that this amount does not bind the 
Utah State Tax Commission, and further only related to tax 
year 1995. 
(Id). Add. F. 
Defendant thereafter filed a written objection, essentially arguing: 
1. The court had no jurisdiction to order defendant to file tax returns for years 
other than 1995; 
2. The court had no jurisdiction to enforce defendant's conviction because he 
never received a pre-trial notice of a tax due. 
3. The court could not order defendant to file a 1995 tax return because it would 
effectively prevent defendant from challenging the deficiency noted in the Notice 
of Deficiency sent him by the state tax commission; and 
4. The court must summarily deny the proposed restitution order because the court 
lacked jurisdiction to set an amount, grant the order or enforce the conviction, 
"and no hearing is needed." 
(R. 898-908) (in Add. F) (emphasis added). 
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B. Appellate review is not warranted because defendant did not preserve 
his claim below. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on 
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111, 10 P.3d 346; see also State v. Cram, 2002 
UT 37, f 14, 46 P.3d 230. "This rule applies to every claim, including constitutional 
questions . . . . " Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 11. It applies in the sentencing phase of 
criminal proceedings as well. See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Utah 1994) 
(appellate court refused to reach challenge to trial court's failure to sentence defendant to 
a lesser penalty because defendant failed to object to the sentence when it was imposed). 
To properly preserve a claim, a party must present the objection to the trial court, state the 
grounds for the objection specifically and distinctly, and ensure that the objection and its 
supporting arguments become part of the trial record. See State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 
1141,1144 (Utah 1989); State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah App. 1993). 
Defendant objected below to the final order of the district court, but he did not 
object to the entry of restitution. Instead, he objected only to the court's order that he file 
a tax return, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to require him to file and that the 
order would, in effect, prevent him from challenging the deficiency Jie Tax Commission 
would ultimately identify. Defendant did not inform the judge that he believed the 
sentence to be improper in any other manner, under either the rules of criminal procedure 
or the restitution statute. Defendant did no^mention the amount of restitution imposed or 
any desire to have a hearing on the amount, and he did not suggest that he had any other 
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evidence he wished to present that had any bearing on the imposition or amount of 
restitution. Hence, his "objection" did not preserve for appeal the arguments he has 
raised. 
£* The district court need not act absent a request from defendant and 
his failure to request a hearing waived his entitlement to one. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not sua sponte ordering a full hearing 
on the restitution issue. Restitution is governed by section 77-38a-301. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-301 (Supp. 2001) (in Add. F). Subsection (4) provides: "If the defendant 
objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the 
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."13 Id. 
It is well-settled that a defendant must object to restitution before a trial court is 
obligated to hold a hearing, and that the objection must relate to "the imposition, amount, 
or distribution" of restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201; see also State v. Breeze, 
2001 UT App 200,16,29 P.3d 19; State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^  9-10, 12 P.3d 
13
 At the time of sentencing in this case, the restitution issue was not ripe for a 
hearing inasmuch as the restitution amount was necessarily tied to the information to be 
provided in the tax return that defendant was to file as part of his sentence (R. 862). The 
presentence investigation report noted that any restitution would be determined only upon 
the filing of the 1995 tax return (R. 750: 2), and defendant repeatedly assured the court at 
sentencing that he would cooperate fully with the Tax Commission and AP&P's 
probation requirements (R. 959:12,13,21). It was not until defendant refused to file the 
return that the State sought to have a restitution amount set by the court. The prosecutor's 
claim that defendant balked at the filing of the return finds support in defendant's 
subsequent written objection to the restitution order, which argues at length that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to order the filing of tax returns (R. 898-908). Accordingly, the 
State's conduct in delaying its restitution request was reasonable under the facts of this 
case and did not rob defendant of the opportunity to request a hearing on the issue. 
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110, cert, granted, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah Feb. 27, 2001); State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 
(Utah App. 1998) (defendant is entitled to a restitution hearing where he requested it). In 
this case, the substance of defendant's written objection clearly establishes that 
defendant's objection was to the court's imposition of the requirement that he file a tax 
return and the effect that order would have on his dealings with the Tax Commission. 
Defendant did not object to the restitution amount or its basis. Accordingly, there was no 
duty on the trial court to provide a restitution hearing. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 
10 (defendant's failure to request a restitution hearing below waived his entitlement to 
such a hearing); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d) ("Failure of the defendant to timely raise 
defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time 
set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof... "). 
Moreover, defendant's written "objection" included an express waiver of a 
restitution hearing. Defendant expressly stated, "... no hearing is needed" (R. 902). 
Add. F. His language was simple and direct, was not couched in conditional terms, and 
did not request or imply a desire for a hearing in the event the court disagreed with 
defendant's argument 
Defendant attempts to rescind his waiver by claiming that "[s]ince the trial court 
did not summarily deny the [State's] request, [defendant] was entitled to a hearing." Br. 2 
of Aplt. at 22, n.4. The law is clear that defendant's entitlement to a restitution hearing is 
dependent upon his timely request for one. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1029 
(Utah 1996) (holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to 
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order of restitution or request a hearing); Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10. Nothing in 
defendant's written objection alerted the district court to this alternative interpretation of 
defendant's express waiver of a hearing. Moreover, the basis of defendant's 
objection—the alleged lack of jurisdiction to order the filing of a tax return—did nothing 
to alert the trial court to the possibility that defendant might want a hearing on the issue of 
the restitution amount. 
The fact that the trial court rendered the restitution order within five days of the 
State's request without waiting for defendant's response does not require reversal. It did 
not obviate defendant's duty to raise his desire for a hearing below or prevent defendant 
from making the request. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 10 (noting that defendant 
had ample opportunity to object to the restitution or request a hearing "before, during, or 
after the court imposed [the restitution] amount" at sentencing). Defendant in fact filed a 
written "objection" after the trial court's ruling. He could have, at that time, objected to 
the restitution itself or made a request for a hearing. He did neither. Instead, he expressly 
stated he did not need a hearing. Had defendant's objection included a hearing request, 
the trial court could have held one and amended the restitution order, if appropriate. Cf. 
State v. Allen, 2000 UT App 340, f 11, 15 P.3d 110 (holding that court retains jurisdiction 
to enforce restitution even after probation expired). 
In any event, defendant's written waiver of a hearing prevents him from prevailing 
on his claim because he essentially "invited" the trial court to forego any hearing. Having 
expressly waived a hearing and having made no mention to the district court of the 
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existence of any additional information relevant to the restitution determination, 
defendant cannot now fault the lower court for failing to intuit that a hearing was 
necessary or desired. He should not now be permitted to benefit from his actions below. 
See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 620 (Utah 1994) (recognizing the invited error 
doctrine), cert denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 
App. 1991) (recognizing that invited error precludes appellate review). 
D. Defendant's failure to establish that his sentence was imposed in an 
illegal manner defeats his request under rule 22(e) 
Defendant also seeks a remand for a restitution hearing under Rule 22(e), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, arguing that absent the hearing he failed to request, the 
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, and that he should be permitted to return to 
the district court to contest the restitution issue. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 9-19,22,28-29 n.7. 
Rule 22(e) provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). This rule permits an 
appellate court to consider the legality of a sentence even if the issue is raised for the first 
time on appeal. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). However, to obtain 
relief on appeal, the defendant must establish that his sentence was imposed in an illegal 
manner. 
He has not done so. He has not shown any duty on the district court to set a 
restitution hearing absent his request, shown that he made a request or that it was denied, 
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or, m any other way, shown that his sentence was "imposed in an illegal manner" so as to 
invoke rule 22(e). 
£ . Defendant waived his claim of error involving the absence of findings 
and a statement of the appropriateness of a restitution award, and 
establishes no plain error on appeal. 
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a remand for a restitution hearing 
because the trial court did not consider relevant statutory factors, as evidenced by the lack 
of any findings regarding restitution. Br. 2 of Aplt. at 26-29. 
The relevant statute provides guidance as to the factors to be considered by the 
trial court in determining restitution.14 However, as stated, defendant never challenged 
,4Section 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i) (1999), provides: 
If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate 
under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a 
part of the court record. 
Add. E. Among other potential factors to be considered, subsection (8)(c)(i), provides: 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection 
(8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the 
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to 
the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an 
installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the 
court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the 
payment of restitution and th^method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines 
make restitution inappropriate. 
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the restitution award itself or the basis of the award, only the trial court's jurisdiction to 
order the filing of a tax return. "'If the trial court, as defendant alleges, erroneously failed 
to consider defendant's paltry financial resources before ordering [restitution], defendant 
should have immediately brought that error to the attention of the sentencing judge. If 
defendant was denied relief at that time, he could have taken [a] direct appeal."' Weeks, 
2000 UT App 273, at ^ 14 (quoting James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 574 (Utah App. 
1998) (emphasis added), cert denied sub nom., James v. Warden, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999)). Because defendant failed to challenge below the factors to be considered by the 
trial court or the court's reasons for deeming a restitution aware appropriate, his claim 
fails on appeal. Id. 
Defendant also argues plain error in the trial court's alleged failure to consider the 
statutory factors and enter appropriate findings before ordering restitution. Br. 2 of Aplt. 
at 28-29, n.7. To establish plain error, defendant must show: 1) that an error existed 2) 
that should have been obvious to the trial court and 3) that was harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). Defendant fails to meet his burden 
on appeal. 
Section 76-3-20 l(8)(b) does not require that the trial court put findings on the 
record concerning each of the named factors. See Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at f 16. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(c)(i) (1999). Add. E. 
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Instead, the statute simply "lists the factors which must be considered, and contains no 
such [recording] requirement." Id. Hence, there is no plain error in the court's failure to 
outline on the record findings underlying its restitution decision. 
Once the court determines whether restitution is or is not appropriate, section 76-3-
201(4)(d)(i) requires that it "make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(d)(i). Add. E. In this case, it is clear from the filings 
relating to restitution and the fact that the case involves a tax debt from 1995 that the 
restitution was appropriate as a realistic estimate of the amount owing by defendant. It is 
also clear that identification of a restitution figure became necessary due to defendant's 
refusal to file his tax return, notwithstanding having promised the court he would 
cooperate with the Tax Commission and file the returns they required of him (R. 959:12, 
13,21). Accordingly, any error in the district court's failure to explain the 
appropriateness of the restitution order would not be plain as the explanation is obvious 
given the circumstances of this case. 
Moreover, the court's failure to expressly explain the appropriateness of the 
restitution order is not harmful in this case. The court expressly provided that the 
restitution figure, which was in line with other estimates in the record of the amount 
owing for the 1995 tax year, would "not bind the Utah State Tax Commission," thereby 
allowing for adjustments to be made to the actual amount eventually found by the Tax 
Commission (R. 907; R. 750:13; R. 959:16). Further, there is no reason to believe that 
the inclusion of a statement explaining why restitution was being ordered would have any 
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beanng on the restitution amount in a case in which the debt is one capable of being 
determined with certainty by the Tax Commission upon discovery of all the relevant 
information. The district court was obviously mindful of this fact in providing the Tax 
Commission leeway to vary from this figure. Accordingly, any error in the court's failure 
to comply with subsection (4)(d)(i) involving the appropriateness of imposing restitution 
would not be harmful in this case. Hence, defendant's plain error claim fails.15 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions and sentences. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / day of October, 2002. 
MARKSHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
[S C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
l5In the event this Court determines that some statement of appropriateness is 
required, it should nevertheless reject defendant's request for a full restitution hearing 
upon remand. Instead, the appropriate remedy is "to order the trial court to comply with 
the statute by giving 'an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it has taken 
into account the appropriate statutory factors.'" Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, at ^ f 17, n.8 
(quoting Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028). 
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Titles 76 and 77 
PART 11 
TAXATION 
76-8-1101. Operating without tax license — Tax evasion — 
Statute of limitations* 
(1) As provided in Section 59-1-401: 
(a) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax 
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or 
permit from the State Tax Commission, or who operates without having 
registered or secured a license or permit, or who operates when the 
registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is 
not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 
59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make, 
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the 
time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any 
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that, 
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor 
more than $5,000. 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the 
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty 
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, 
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
(2) The *t*tute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is 
i£ years from the date the tax should have been remitted. 
History: C. IMS, 76-8-1101, enacted by L. 






Titles 76 and 77 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered fo&the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought By the defendant. 
Hirtory: C. 1M3, 76-1-402, enacted by L. 
1973, oh. I S * ft 76-1-408; 1974, ch. 32, ft 2. 
9 f ^ u t t Attempt to evaae or aereat tax 
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or 
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in 
addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony 
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 
($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more 
than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. 
(Aug. 16, 1954, c. 736, 68A Stat. 851; Sept. 3, 1982, Pub.L. 97-248, Title III, 
§ 329(a), 96 Stat. 618.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Amendments 
1954 Act- House Report No. 1337. 19*1 Amendment Pub.L. 97-248 sub-
Senate Report No. 1622. and Conference diluted "$ 100,000 «5(».000 in the case 
Report No. 2543. see 1954 U.S.Code of a corporation) for $10.00T. 
Cong, and Adm.News, pp. 4572, 5251, Effective Dates 
5343, respectively. 1982 Act. Section 329(e) of Pub.L 
*. ^ *~ 97-248 provided that: The amendments 
1982 Act. Senate Report No. 97-494.
 madc o y this section [amending this sec-
House Conference Report No. 97-760. tion and sections 7203. 7206, and 7207 of 
and Statements by Legislative Leaders, this title] shall apply to offenses commit-
see 1982 U.S.Code Cong, and AdmNews, ted after the date of the enactment of 






Internal Revenue Code 
§§ 7201 to 7440 
m .-VW. »»•••*«! IOIIUIC w inc rvwrn, suppiy iniormauon, or pay tax 
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required l>\ 
this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep an; 
records, or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax 
make sucji return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times 
required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, tx 
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, oi 
both, together with the costs of prosecution. In the case of any person with respect u 
whom there is a failure to pay any estimated tax, this section shall not apply to such 
person with respect to such failure if there is no addition to tax under section 6664 ot 
6665 with respect to such failure. In the case of a willful violation of any provision ol 
section 60501, the first sentence of this section shall be applied by substituting "felony' 
for "misdemeanor" and "5 years" for "1 year". 
(Aug. 16,1954, c. 736, 68A Stat 851; June 28,1968, Pub.L. 90-364, Title I, § 10S(eX6), 82 Stat 264, 
Sept 3,1982, Pub.L. 97-248, Title in , ft$ 327,329(b), 96 Stat 617, 618; July 18,1984, Pub.L. 98-369, 
Div. A, Title IV, $ 412(bX9), 98 Stat 792; Nov. 18, 1988, Pub.L. 100-690, Tide VII, § 7601(aX2XB), 
102 Stat 4604; Nov. 29,1990, Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXXIII, * 3808(a), 104 Stat. 4918.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Sevtaion Notes and Legislative Reports Effective Dates 
•
 r
 provided that: The amendment made by sub-
section (a) [amending this section] shall apply to 
1910 Amendment Pub.L. 101-647 aubetftut- actions, and failure* to act, occurring after the 
ad in laet aentence "anbelftuting felony* for traie- date of the enactment of thia Act [Nov. 29, 
demeanor1 and *6 yeara* for '1 year* * for "aubeti- 1990).* 
felting '6 yean' for '1 year*". 
UNITED STATES CODE 
ANNOTATED 
Title 2 6 
Internal Revenue Code 
§§ 7201 to 7440 
2001 
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part 
Addendum B 
Thomas H. Smith 
1301 WHBR 
Vernal, UT 84078 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
THOMAS H. SMITH, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 99192022$ 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ORAL 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
MULTIPLICIOUS CHARGE IN 
AMENDED (2nd) INFORMATION 
Judge: Ann M. Stirfoa 
I. FACTS 
1. On October 12,1999, the Plaintiff filed an original Information containing two (2) 
counts. 
2. On the April 4, 2001, the Plaintiff filed an amended Information containing two 
(2) criminal counts, citing violations of Utah Code Annotated (1953 Amended) § 
76-8-1101 and 76-8-1101(l)(c). 
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3. On the date of trial, April 9, 2001, the Plaintiff amended a second time the 
Information reflecting two (2) criminal counts, citing violation of Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 Amended) § 76-8-1101(l)(b) and § 76-8-1101(l)(c). 
4. On the date of trial, April 9, 2001, the Defendant objected to the interlineation 
and the creation of the superseding Information. 
5. In camera, on the day of trial, the Trial Court ordered the defense to brief the 
Court. 
H. HISTORY 
In case instant, Defendant orally argued the charging instrument, an 
Information, that Count 2 was a reiteration of Count 1 in different verbiage. Citing 
US v. Hord. 6 F.3d 276 (5th Cir, (1993)) as a basis, the instrument is defective because 
a single offense had been alleged in a number of counts, unfairly increasing the 
defendant's exposure to criminal sanctions. 
ffl. ARGUMENT 
In Hord. the appeal concerned multiplicious convictions for bank fraud, and 
turned on the question of when a "scheme" is "executed" for purposes of the bank 
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fraud statute. Douglas James Hord was convicted on 19 counts: nine for executing 
and attempting to execute a scheme to defraud a federally insured bank; and ten for 
making false statements to the bank. He was sentenced to 19 concurrent six-month 
terms of imprisonment. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, upon appeal, affirmed in 
part and reversed and vacated in part. 
Hord contended that all nine counts [over a period of time] related to the same 
offense — a single scheme to defraud a single financial institution. Before trial, he 
moved to consolidate all nine counts on the ground that they were multiplicious. 
The District court denied the motion. However upon appeal, the 5th Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that counts one and seven through nine were multiplicious, 
reversed those convictions and vacated the sentences imposed pursuant to them. 
Similar in that it deals with fraud, Lemons (941 F.2d 309, (5th Cir. (1991))), 
involved a scheme to procure monetary benefit from a single financial institution. 
The scheme for the receiving of the said benefits, occurred in a series of transactions, 
over the course of several months. The Court found a two-loan scheme may subject 
an institution to greater risk than a scheme involving only one transaction, it is the 
execution of the scheme itself that subjects a defendant to criminal liability, not the 
execution of each step or transaction in furtherance of the scheme. Because the 
Lemon' indictments sought to punish for execution of the multiple steps involved 
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in the scheme, the counts were multiplicitous therefore, the Appeals Court 
remanded the case. 
The Appeals Court, in Hord. quotes the findings in Lemons, that "the bank fraud 
statute imposes punishment [...] for each execution of the "scheme" to defraud, 
rather than for each act in execution of the scheme. The Court in Lemons, held the 
incremental movement of the benefit to the defendant was "only part of but one 
performance, one completion, one execution of that scheme." In US v. Heath, (970 
F.2d 1397, 1402 (5th Cir. (1992)), the Court found a critical factor to hold whether 
there a was single execution of a scheme to defraud, although involving procuring 
two separate loans from a single financial, was whether the two loans were 
integrally related; where neither scheme to defraud could have succeeded without 
the other. 
In the case instant, the Plaintiff charges the defendant with intent to evade by 
failing to make, render, sign, or verify a tax return (§ 76-8-1101(l)(b)) and willfully 
tax evasion (§ 76-8-1101(l)(c)) for the year 1995 . 
In parallel argument in accordance with Lemons, Hord and Heath, 
substantively, the Plaintiff has failed to show that § 76-8-1101(1)0)), evading any tax 
by failure to make, render, sign, or verify any return; and § 76-8-llOKlMc), a willful 
attempt to evade or defeat any taxes are not integrally related, and are any thing 
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more than "executions" or "performances" of a single scheme. In fact, the 
performance of such evasion scheme as in § 76-8-1101(l)(c) is doomed to failure 
without the positive actions enumerated in § 76-8-1101(l)(b). 
In the analysis of Plaintiffs allegations, in light of Hord, Lemons, and Heath, it is 
obvious the allegations are based upon a single scheme from an alleged single 
episode, even though the Plaintiff contends that "evasion" by failing to make, 
render, sign, or verify a tax return and attempting to "evade" tax are separate 
independent violations. The Plaintiff's reasoning is flawed in, that similar 
behavior, engaged in on separate occasions, may sometimes constitute several 
separate violations. Plaintiff makes no such claim of separate occasions. The fact 
that the allegations are based upon a single episode/scheme is undisputed by either 
party. It then is obvious, the Plaintiff is attempting to separate an alleged single 
scheme into separate executions merely to increase the probability of gaining a 
conviction, by exposing the Defendant to a greater selection of criminal sanctions 
available to the trier-of-fact — the very objective the Courts intended to prevent in 
in grabowski Y. Jackson County Public Defenders, (47 F.3d 1386 (5th Or. (1995)), 
Grabowski appealed the denial of his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
challenging the legality of his conviction, and the denial of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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prisoner complaint. The Appeals Court affirmed in part and remanded with 
instructions in part. The Appeals Court in its' analysis of the claim of double 
jeopardy, concluded there was no violation in Grabowski's convictions because the 
evidence and elements of the crime of burglary/larceny were not [according to 
Mississippi statutory law] the same as the crime of robbery. Continuing, the Court 
cited the finding in Blockburger v. US. (284 U.S. 299,52 S.Ct. 180,76 L. Ed. 306 (1932)), 
and indicated the test for double jeopardy is whether each offense requires proof of 
an additional fact which the other does not. 
Not so in § 76-8-1101(l)(c) and § 76-8-1101(l)(b). Neither "intent7' or "willful" are 
crimes, but in both § 76-8-1101(l)(c) and § 76-8-1101(l)(b) the criminal act is evasion. 
Section 76-8-1101(l)(b) enumerates the actions required to prescribe "intent." A 
"willful" act described in § 76-8-1101(l)(c) requires the same overt actions as 
delineated in § 76-8-1101(l)(b). Plainly there is no significant or practical difference 
in the usage of the words "intent" or "willful" as adjectives used below. 
Intent:* 1. Firmly fixed; concentrated. 
2. Having the attention applied; 
3. Having the mind and will focused on a specific purpose. 
Willful:* 1. Said or done on purpose; deliberate. 
2. Obstinately bent on having one's own way. 




(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax [...], fails to make, 
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within 
the time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or 
verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies 
any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, 
[...]. (Emphasis added) 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the 
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, 
guilty of a second degree felony[...]. (Emphasis added) 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the case instant, Count I and Count II are identical charges phrased differently. 
Both counts stem from the same alleged episode or scheme. Both require the same 
elements to be proven, § 76-8-1101(l)(c) being subsumed by the explicit listing in § 
76-8-1101(l)(b). 
Given the arguments above and the analysis of the various District and Appeals 
Courts, Count I and Count II, as they stand, prejudices the cause of the Defendant 
and places the Defendant in an untenable position, on the slippery slope, of having 
to defend against multiple charges, unfairly increasing the Defendant's exposure to 
criminal sanctions. 
Consequentially, the Court instant should find Count II a multiplicious 
redactment of Count I and therefore Count II should be dismissed. 
Page 7 
Dated: 11 t h day of April, 2001 
Respectfully submitted, 
^TfiOMAS H. SMTH 
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the counts would be multiplicious and they're put there—in 
there only for the chance, for the reason of allowing the 
State to increase their chance of—from one out of one to 
three out of four of getting a conviction. 
And that puts the defendant in an untenable 
position, puts the defendant in a—a position of not having 
a level playing field in this issue, of—of having a reduced 
chance of being found not guilty. And that then becomes 
multiplicious under the definitions. 
Now, the reason that Fifth Circuit cases are used 
is because that's the only circuit that's ruled on this 
issue. There are no other cases available on multi— 
multipliciousness out of any other circuits, including the 
Tenth Circuit; so therefore, we relied on information from 
the First Circuit—Fifth Circuit because they're the ones 
who ruled on it. And I believe it would be applicable in 
this circuit since it's the only cases available. 
THE COURT: Based on the argument that's been 
made, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be 
denied. I think the arguments made by counsel are 
persuasive and that there are two separate counts in this 
here and that there are ot^er statutes that I'm quite aware 
of, criminal statutes essentially have the same type of 
wording and—and separate counts. 
The case of the Fifth—is it the Eighth—Eighth 
529 
Circuit, isn't it? Down in— 
MR. SMITH: Vernal. 
THE COURT: —Vernal. And Mr.—Judge Payne, I 
think are different cases, different fact situations, 
different law so it's not binding on this Court here. 
And as far as the Fifth Circuit, it's a different 
jurisdiction. I don't know whether we've had any here and 
the State has not had a chance to research that because it 
was just given this recently; but the Court is of the 
opinion, just based on the arguments that's been made, that 
the Court—the State's arguments are persuasive at this time 
and the Court's going to deny the motion to dismiss or to 
drop on count in this case. 
(Off the record.) 
MR. BAER: Judge, I think the Court's ruled, I was 
wondering if we could proceed. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. 
MR. SMITH: I guess I'm back up here, aren't I? 
MR. BAER: I think he was still on the stand; 
right? 
THE COURT: Okay. Get the jury in. 
I just want to apologize again, we've been going 
over these jury instructions and having some problems in 
determining—determining which ones we should give and which 
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Argued Oct. 3, 1990. 
Decided Jan. 8, 1991 
Defendant was convicted in the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Paul E. 
Plunkett, J , of attempting to evade income taxes and 
failing to file income tax returns, and he appealed. The 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 882 
F.2d 1263. The Umted States Supreme Court, Justice 
White, held that: (1) defendant was not entitled to 
acquittal based on good-faith belief that income tax law 
was unconstitutional as applied to him and thus did not 
legally impose any duty on him, but (2) defendant's 
good-faith belief that the tax laws did not impose any 
duty on him did not have to be objectively reasonable 
in order to be considered by the jury. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Justice Scaha, filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. 
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Justice Marshall joined. 
Justice Souter did not participate. 
Opinion on remand, 931 F 2d 1206. 
West Headnotes 
HI Criminal Law €=>313 
110k313 Most Cited Cases 
Based on the notion that the law is definite and 
knowable, common law presumed that every persoft 
knew the law 
121 Internal Revenue €=>526335 
220k5263 35 Most Cited Cases 
"Willfulness" for purposes of criminal tax laws requires 
the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty 
on the defendant, that the defendant knew of the duty, 
and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that 
duty 26 U S C A H 7201. 7203 
131 Criminal Law €=>20 
110k20 Most Cited Cases 
Where issue is whether defendant knew of duty 
purportedly imposed by statute or regulation he is 
accused of violating, if Government proves actual 
knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, 
without more, has satisfied the knowledge component 
of the willfulness requirement. 
141 Internal Revenue €=^5300 
220k5300 Most Cited Cases 
Government has not proved that defendant was aware 
of the duty imposed by the tax law which he is accused 
of willfully disobeying if the jury credits a good- faith 
misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or not 
the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively 
reasonable. 26U.S.C.A. fr§ 7201. 7203 
I S Internal Revenue €=>526335 
220kS263.35 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's claimed good-faith belief need not be 
objectively reasonable in order for it to negate 
Government's evidence purporting to show defendant's 
awareness of his duties under the tax laws. 26 
U.S.CA. S$ 7201. 7203. 
Ifl Constitutional Law €=>38 
92k38 Most Cited Cases 
Where possible, court interprets congressional 
enactments so as to avoid raising serious constitutional 
questions. 
£0 Internal Revenue €=>5317 
220k5317 Most Cited Cases 
It was error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of 
defendant's understanding that, within meaning of the 
tax laws, he was not person required to file a return or 
to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable 
income, as incredible as those misunderstandings of and 
beliefs about the tax law might be 26 U S C A fr§ 
7201. 7203 
181 Internal Revenue €=>5263 J 5 
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases 
Copr © West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
Paiie 2 
Defendant's good-faith belief that income tax law was 
unconstitutional as applied to him did not provide 
defense to charges of willfully attempting to evade 
income taxes and failing to file income tax returns, 
notwithstanding claim that, because of his belief in the 
unconstitutionality of the tax laws as applied to him, the 
income tax laws could not legally impose any duty 
upon him of which he should have been aware. 26 
U.S.C.A. SS 7201. 7203. 
**605 Syllabus iFN*l 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the 
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by 
the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience 
of the reader. See United Stares v. Detroit 
Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 321, 337.26 S.Ct. 282. 
287, 50 L.Ed. 499. 
Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of 
willfully failing to file a federal income tax return in 
violation of § 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade 
his income taxes in violation of $ 7201. Although 
admitting that he had not filed his returns, he testified 
that he had not acted willfully because he sincerely 
believed, based on his indoctrination by a group 
believing that the federal tax system is unconstitutional 
and his own study, that the tax laws were being 
unconstitutionally enforced and that his actions were 
lawful. In instructing the jury, the court stated that an 
honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does 
not negate willfulness, and that Cheek's beliefs that 
wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer 
within the meaning of the Code were not objectively 
reasonable. It also instructed the jury that a person's 
opinion that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights 
does not constitute a good-faith misunderstanding of 
the law. Cheek was convicted, and the Court of 
Appeals affirmed. 
Held: 
1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a 
good-faith belief that one is not violating the law 
negates willfulness, whether or not the claimed belief or 
misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. Statutory 
willfulness, which protects the average citizen from 
prosecution for innocent mistakes made due to the 
complexity of the tax laws, United States v. Murdoch 
290 U.S. 389. 54 S.Ct 223. 78 L.Ed. 381. is the 
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. 
United States v. Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10.97 S.Ct. 22.50 
L.Ed.2d 12. Thus, if the jury credited Cheek's 
assertion that he truly believed that the Code did not 
treat wages as income, the Government would not have 
carried its burden to prove willfulness, however 
unreasonable a court might deem such a belief. 
Characterizing a belief as objectively 
unreasonable**606 transforms what is normally a 
factual inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a jury 
from considering it. And forbidding a jury to consider 
evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a 
serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial 
provision, which this interpretation of die statute 
avoids. Of course, in deciding whether to credit 
Cheek's claim, the jury is free to consider any 
admissible evidence showing that he had knowledge of 
his legal duties. Pp. 609-612. 
*193 2. It was proper for the trial court to instruct the 
jury not to consider Cheek's claim that the tax laws are 
unconstitutional, since a defendant's views about the tax 
statutes' validity are irrelevant to the issue of 
willfulness and should not be heard by a jury. Unlike 
the claims in the Murdock-Pomponio line of cases, 
claims that Code provisions are unconstitutional do not 
arise from innocent mistakes caused by the Code's 
complexity. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the 
provisions at issue and a studied conclusion that those 
provisions are invalid and unenforceable. Congress 
could not have contemplated that a taxpayer, without 
risking criminal prosecution, could ignore his duties 
under the Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms 
Congress provided to present his invalidity claims to 
the courts and to abide by their decisions. Cheek was 
free to pay the tax, file for a refund, and, if denied, 
present his claims to the courts. Also, without paying 
the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax 
deficiencies in the Tax Court. Pp. 612-613. 
882F.2d 1263. (CA7 1989) vacated and remanded. 
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in 
which REHNQUIST, C.J., and STEVENS, 
O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. SCALIA, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 
613. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 
which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 614. 
SOUTER, J., took no part in the consideration or 
decision of the case. 
William R. Coulson argued the cause for petitioner. 
With him on the briefs was Susan M. Keegan. 
Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United 
States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General 
Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy 
Solicitor General Bryson, Robert E. Lindsay, and Alan 
Hechtkopf. 
Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
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title 26 ^ ~2Ul of thi Lmtcd States Code provides 
that any person "who willfully attempts in any manner 
to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the 
payment thereof shall be guilty of a felony Under 26 
U S.C. S 7203, n[a]ny person required under this title 
or by regulations made under authority thereof to make 
a return who willfully fails to make such return" 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor *194 This case turns 
on the meaning of the word "willfully" as used in ££ 
7201 and 7203 
I 
Petitioner John L. Cheek has been a pilot for American 
Airlines since 1973 He filed federal income tax returns 
through 1979 but thereafter ceased to file returns IFN11 
He also claimed an increasing number of withholding 
allowances-eventually claiming 60 allowances by 
mid-1980-and for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated on 
his W-4 forms that he was exempt from federal income 
taxes In 1983, petitioner unsuccessfully sought a 
refund of all tax withheld by his employer in 1982 
Petitioner's income during this period at all times far 
exceeded the minimum necessary to digger the 
statutory filing requirement. 
FN1. Cheek did file what the Court of 
Appeals described as a frivolous return in 
1982 
As a result of his activities, petitioner was indicted for 
10 violations of federal law. He was charged with six 
counts of willfully failing to file a federal income tax 
return for the years 1980,1981, and 1983 through 1986, 
m violation of § 7203. He was further charged with 
three counts of willfully attempting to **607 evade his 
income taxes for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 in 
violation of 26 U S C § 7201. In those years, 
American Airlines withheld substantially less than the 
amount of tax petitioner owed because of the numerous 
allowances and exempt status he claimed on his W-4 
forms FFN2I The tax offenses with which petitioner 
was charged are specific intent crimes that require the 
defendant to have acted willfully. 
FN2. Because petitioner filed a refund claim 
for the entire amount withheld by his 
employer in 1982, petitioner was also charged 
under 18 U S C $ 287 with one count of 
presenting a claim to an agency of the United 
States knowing the claim to be false and 
fraudulent 
At trial, the evidence established that between 1982 
and 1986, petitioner was involved in at least four civil 
cases that *195 challenged various aspects of the 
federal income tax system fFN31 In all four of those 
cases, the plaintiffs were informed by the courts that 
many of their arguments, including that they were not 
taxpayers within the meaning of the tax laws, that 
wages are not mcome, that the Sixteenth Amendment 
does not authorize the imposition of an income tax on 
individuals, and that the Sixteenth Amendment is 
unenforceable, were frivolous or had been repeatedly 
rejected by the courts. During this time period, 
petitioner also attended at least two criminal tnals of 
persons charged with tax offenses. In addition, there 
was evidence that m 1980 or 1981 an attorney had 
advised Cheek that the courts had rejected as frivolous 
the claim that wages are not income. TFN41 
FN3. In March 1982, Cheek and another 
employee of the company sued American 
Airlines to challenge the withholding of 
federal income taxes In April 1982, Cheek 
sued the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the 
United States Tax Court, asserting that he was 
not a taxpayer or a person for purposes of the 
Internal Revenue Code and that his wages 
were not income, and making several other 
related claims. Cheek and four others also 
filed an action against the Umted States and 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue m 
Federal District Court, claiming that 
withholding taxes from their wages violated 
the Sixteenth Amendment. Finally, in 1985 
Cheek filed claims with the IRS seeking to 
have refunded the taxes withheld from his 
wages in 1983 and 1984. When these claims 
were not allowed, he brought suit in the 
District Court claiming that the withholding 
was an unconstitutional taking of his property 
and that his wages were not income In 
dismissing this action as frivolous, the District 
Court imposed costs and attorneys fees of 
$1,500 and a sanction under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11 in the amount of $10,000 
The Court of Appeals agreed that Cheek's 
claims were frivolous, reduced the District 
Court sanction to $5,000, and imposed an 
additional sanction of $1,500 for bringing a 
frivolous appeal. 
FN4. The attorney also advised that despite 
the Fifth Amendment, the filing of a tax return 
was required and that a person could 
challenge the constitutionality of the system 
by suing for a refund after the taxes had been 
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withheld or by putting himself "at nsk of 
criminal prosecution" 
Cheek represented himself at trial and testified in his 
defense He admitted that he had not filed personal 
income tax returns during the years in question He 
testified that as early as 1978, he had begun attending 
seminars sponsored *196 by, and following the advice 
of, a group that believes, among other things, that the 
federal tax system is unconstitutional. Some of the 
speakers at these meetings were lawyers who purported 
to give professional opinions about the invalidity of the 
federal mcome tax laws. Cheek produced a letter from 
an attorney statmg that the Sixteenth Amendment did 
not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on 
gam or profit Petitioner's defense was that, based on 
the indoctrination he received from this group and from 
his own study, he sincerely believed that the tax laws 
were bemg unconstitutionally enforced and that his 
actions during the 1980-1986 period were lawful He 
therefore argued that he had acted without the 
willfulness required for conviction of the various 
offenses with which he was charged. 
In the course of its instructions, the trial court advised 
the jury that to prove "willfulness" the Government 
must prove the voluntary and intentional violation of a 
known legal duty, a burden that could not be proved by 
showmg mistake, ignorance, or negligence. **608 The 
court further advised the jury that an objectively 
reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the law 
would negate willfulness, but mere disagreement with 
the law would not The court described Cheek's beliefs 
about the mcome tax system [FN51 and instructed the 
jury that if it found that Cheek "honestly and reasonably 
believed that *197 he was not required to pay mcome 
taxes or to file tax returns," App. 81, a not guilty verdict 
should be returned. 
FN5. "The defendant has testified as to what 
he states are his interpretations of the United 
States Constitution, court opinions, common 
law and other materials he has reviewed... He 
has also introduced materials which contain 
references to quotations from the Umted 
States Constitution, court opinions, statutes, 
and other sources. 
"He testified he relied on his interpretations 
and on these materials m concludmg that he 
was not a person required to file mcome tax 
returns for the year or years charged, was not 
required to pay mcome taxes and that he could 
claim exempt status on his W-4 forms, and 
that he could claim refunds of all moneys 
withheld" App 75-76 
"Among other things Mr Cheek contends that 
his wages from a pnvate employer, American 
Airlines, does [sic ] not constitute income 
under the Internal Revenue Service laws " Id 
at 81 
After several hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note 
to the judge that stated in part: 
" 'We have a basic disagreement between some of us 
as to if Mr Cheek honestly & reasonably believed 
that he was not required to pay mcome taxes 
" 'Page 32 [the relevant jury instruction] discusses 
good faith misunderstanding & disagreement. Is 
there any additional clarification you can give us on 
this point?'" W,at85. 
The District Judge responded with a supplemental 
instruction containing the foliowmg statements. 
"[A] person's opinion that the tax laws violate his 
constitutional rights does not constitute a good faith 
misunderstanding of the law. Furthermore, a 
person's disagreement with the government's tax 
collection systems and policies does not constitute a 
good faith misunderstanding of the law." Id, at 86. 
At the end of the first day of deliberation, the jury sent 
out another note saymg that it still could not reach a 
verdict because " '[w]e are divided on the issue as to if 
Mr. Cheek honestly & reasonably believed that he was 
not required to pay mcome tax.'" Id, at 87. When the 
jury resumed its deliberations, the District Judge gave 
the jury an additional instruction. This instruction stated 
in part that "[a]n honest but unreasonable belief is not 
a defense and does not negate willfulness," id, at 88, 
and that "[ajdvice or research resultmg m the 
conclusion that wages of a privately employed person 
are not mcome or that the tax laws are unconstitutional 
is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the 
basu for a good faith misunderstanding of the law 
defense." Ibid The court also instructed the jury that 
"[pjersistent refusal to acknowledge the law does not 
constitute a good *198 faith misunderstanding of the 
law." Ibid Approximately two hours later, the jury 
returned a verdict finding petitioner guilty on all counts. 
fFN61 
FN6. A note signed by all 12 jurors also 
informed the judge that although the jury 
found petitioner guilty, several jurors wanted 
to express their personal opinions of the case 
and that notes from these individual jurors to 
the court were "a complaint agamst the narrow 
& hard expression under the constraints of the 
Copr © West 2002 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
Paee 5 
law " Id at 90 At least two notes from 
individual jurors expressed the opinion that 
petitioner sincerely believed m his cause even 
though his beliefs might have been 
unreasonable. 
Petitioner appealed his convictions, arguing that the 
District Court erred by instructing the jury that only an 
objectively reasonable misunderstanding of the law 
negates the statutory willfulness requirement. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
rejected that contention and affirmed the convictions. 
882 F,2d 1263 (1989). In prior cases, the Seventh 
Circuit had made clear that good-faith 
misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness only if 
the defendant's **609 beliefs are objectively 
reasonable; in the Seventh Circuit, even actual 
ignorance is not a defense unless the defendant's 
ignorance was itself objectively reasonable. See, e g, 
United States v. Buckner. 830 F 2d 102 {1987). In its 
opmion in this case, the court noted that several 
specified beliefs, including the beliefs that the tax laws 
are unconstitutional and that wages are not income, 
would not be objectively reasonable. [FN71 Because 
the Seventh Circuit's *199 interpretation of "willfully" 
as used in these statutes conflicts with the decisions of 
several other Courts of Appeals, see, e g, United States 
v. Whiteside. 810 F.2d 1306, 1310-1311 (CAS 1987): 
United States v Phillips. 775 F 2d 262.263-264 (CA10 
1985): United States v Aitken 755 F 2d 188. 191-193 
(CA1 1985). we granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 1068. 110 
S.Ct. 1108.107 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1990). 
FN7. The opinion stated, 882 F 2d 1263. 
1268-1269. n. 2 (CA7 1989). as follows: 
"For the record, we note that the following 
beliefs, which are stock arguments of the tax 
protester movement, have not been, nor ever 
will be, considered 'objectively reasonable' in 
this circuit: "(1) the belief that the sixteenth 
amendment to the constitution was improperly 
ratified and therefore never came into being; 
"(2) the belief that the sixteenth amendment is 
unconstitutional generally; 
"(3) the belief that the income tax violates the 
takings clause of the fifth amendment; 
"(4) the belief that the tax laws are 
unconstitutional; 
"(5) the belief that wages are not income and 
therefore are not subject to federal income tax 
laws; 
"(6) the belief that filing a tax return violates 
the privilege agamst self-incrimination; and 
"(7) the belief that Federal Reserve Notes do 
not constitute cash or income 
"Millet > Lmted States N68 1 2d 2V>. 219-4 1 
(7th Cir.1989), Bittknet, 830 h 2d at 102. 
United States v. Dube. 820 F 2d 886. 891 < 7th 
Cir.1987): Coleman v Comm'r 791 F2d68. 
70-71 (7thCir.1986); Moore 627F2dat833 
We have no doubt that this list will increase 
with time." 
II 
[11 The general rule that ignorance of the law or a 
mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is 
deeply rooted in the American legal system. See, e g, 
United States v. Smith. 5 Wheat. 153. 182. 5 L.Ed. 57 
(1820) (Livmgston, J., dissenting); Barlow v United 
States. 7 Pet. 404. 411. 8 L.Ed. 728 (1833): Reynolds 
v. United States. 98 U S 145. 167. 25 L.Fd. 244 
(1879). Shevhn-Carpenter Co v Minnesota. 218 U S 
57. 68. 30 S.Ct. 663. 666. 54 L.Ed. 930 (1910): 
Lambert v California. 355 U S 225.228. 78 S Ct. 240. 
242. 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957): Lwarotav United States 
471 U.S. 419. 441. 105 S.Ct 2084. 2096. 85 L.Ed.2d 
434(1985) (WHITE, J , dissenting); O. Holmes, The 
Common Law 47-48 (1881). Based on the notion that 
the law is definite and knowable, the common law 
presumed that every person knew the law. This 
common-law rule has been applied by the Court in 
numerous cases construing criminal statutes. See, e g, 
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical 
Corp.. 402 US. 558. 91 S Ct. 1697. 29 L Ed.2d 178 
(1971): Hamhns v United States, 418 U.S. 87. 
119-124. 94 S.Ct. 2887. 2808-2911. 41 L.Ed.2d 590 
(1974): Bo\ce Motor Lines, Inc v United States 342 
U.S. 337. 72 S.Ct 329.96 L.EA 367 (1952). 
The proliferation of statutes and regulations has 
sometimes made it difficult for the average citizen to 
know and comprehend *200 the extent of the duties and 
obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has 
accordmgly softened the impact of the common-law 
presumption by making specific intent to violate the 
law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses 
Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the 
statutory term "willfully" as used in the federal criminal 
tax statutes as carving out an exception to the 
traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax 
offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax 
laws. In United States v Murdock 290 U.S 389 54 
S.Ct. 223. 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933), the Court recognized 
that: 
"Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of 
a bona fide misunderstanding as **610 to his liability 
for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as to 
the adequacy of the records he maintained, should 
become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up 
to the prescribed standard of conduct." Id, at 3%. 54 
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S.Ct., at 226. 
The Court held that the defendant was entitled to an 
instruction with respect to whether he acted in good 
faith based on his actual belief. In Murdoch, the Court 
interpreted the term "willfully" as used in the criminal 
tax statutes generally to mean "an act done with a bad 
purpose," id. at 394, 54 S.Ct. at 225, or with "an evil 
motive," id. at 395. 54 S.Ct.. at 225. 
Subsequent decisions have refined this proposition. In 
United States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 346, 93 S.Ct. 2008, 
36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973), we described the term 
"willfully" as connoting "a voluntary, intentional 
violation of a known legal duty," id. at 360, 93 S.Ct, 
at 2017. and did so with specific reference to the "bad 
faith or evil intent" language employed in Murdock. 
Still later, United States v. Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10, 97 
S.Ct 22.50L.Ed.2d 1211976) (per curiam), addressed 
a situation in which several defendants had been 
charged with willfully filing false tax returns. The jury 
was given an instruction on willfulness similar to the 
standard set forth in Bishop. In addition, it was 
instructed that" '[g]ood motive alone is never a defense 
where the act done or omitted is a crime.' " Id. at 11, 
97 S.Ct. at 23. The defendants were convicted but the 
Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the latter 
instruction *201 was improper because the statute 
required a finding of bad purpose or evil motive. Ibid. 
We reversed the Court of Appeals, stating that "the 
Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the reference 
to an 'evil motive' in United States v. Bishop, supra, and 
prior cases," ibid, "requires proof of any motive other 
than an intentional violation of a known legal duty.'* 
Id. at 12, 97 S.Ct, at 23. As "the other Courts of 
Appeals that have considered the question have 
recognized, willfulness in this context simply means a 
voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." 
Ibid. We concluded that after instructing the jury on 
willfulness, "[a]n additional instruction on good faith 
was unnecessary." Id., at 13. 97 S.Ct. at 24. Taken 
together, Bishop and Pomponio conclusively establish 
that the standard for die statutory willfulness 
requirement is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a 
known legal duty." 
m 
Cheek accepts the Pomponio definition of willfulness, 
Brief for Petitioner 5, and n. 4, 13,36; Reply Brief for 
Petitioner 4, 6-7, 11, 13, but asserts that the District 
Court's instructions and the Court of Appeals' opinion 
departed from that definition. In particular, he 
challenges the ruling that a good-faith 
misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that 
one is not violating the law, if it is to negate willfulness, 
must be objectively reasonable. We agree that the 
Court of Appeals and the District Court erred in this 
respect. 
A 
I"21f31f41 Willfulness, as construed by our prior 
decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the 
Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on 
the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and 
that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. 
We deal first with the case where the issue is whether 
the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by 
the provision of the statute or regulation he is accused 
of violating, a case in which there is no claim that the 
provision *202 at issue is invalid. In such a case, if the 
Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent 
legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied 
the knowledge component of the willfulness 
requirement. But carrying this burden requires 
negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or 
a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, 
he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any 
of the provisions of the tax laws. This is so **611 
because one cannot be aware that the law imposes a 
duty upon him and yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand 
the law, or believe that the duty does not exist In the 
end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the 
Government has proved that the defendant was aware 
of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury 
credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief 
submission, whether or not the claimed belief or 
misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. 
In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly believed 
that the Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat 
wages as income, and the jury believed him, the 
Government would not have carried its burden to prove 
willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem 
such a belief. Of course, in deciding whether to credit 
Cheek's good-faith belief claim, the jury would be free 
to consider any admissible evidence from any source 
showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a 
return and to treat wages as income, including evidence 
showing his awareness of the relevant provisions of the 
Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting his 
interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of 
the Internal Revenue Service, or of any contents of the 
personal income tax return forms and accompanying 
instructions that made it plain that wages should be 
returned as income. TFN81 
FN8. Cheek recognizes that a "defendant who 
knows what the law is and who disagrees with 
it ... does not have a bona fide 
misunderstanding defense," but asserts that "a 
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defendant who has a bona fide 
misunderstanding of [the law] does not 'know' 
his legal duty and lacks willfulness." Brief 
for Petitioner 29, and n. 13. The Reply Brief 
for Petitioner, at 13, states: "We are in no 
way suggesting that Cheek or anyone else is 
immune from criminal prosecution if he 
knows what the law is, but believes it should 
be otherwise, and therefore violates it." See 
also Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 11, 12, 15, 17. 
f5ir61 *203 We thus disagree with the Court of 
Appeals' requirement that a claimed good-faith belief 
must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered 
as possibly negating the Government's evidence 
purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal 
duty at issue. Knowledge and belief are 
characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this 
case the jury. Characterizing a particular belief as not 
objectively reasonable transforms the inquiry into a 
legal one and would prevent the jury from considering 
it. It would of course be proper to exclude evidence 
having no relevance or probative value with respect to 
willfulness; but it is not contrary to common sense, let 
alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his 
duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty, 
and forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might 
negate willfulness would raise a serious question under 
the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision. Cf. 
Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307. 105 S.Ct. 1965. 85 
L.Ed.2d 344(1985): Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S. 
510.99 S.Ct 2450. 61 LJEd.2d 39 (1979): Morissette 
v. United States. 342 U.S. 246. 72 S.Ct. 240. 96 L.Ed. 
288 (1952V It is common ground that this Court, 
where possible, interprets congressional enactments so 
as to avoid raising serious constitutional questions. 
See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Cory, v. Florida Gulf 
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council. 485 
U.S. 568. 575. 108 S.Ct 1392. 1397. 99 L.E&2d 645 
(1988): Crowell v Benson, 285 U.S. 22. 62. and n. 30. 
52 S.Ct 285. 296. and n. 30. 76 L.E& 598 (1932): 
Public Citizen v. Department of Justice. 491 U.S. 440. 
465-466.109 S.Ct 2558.2S72-2S73. IPS L.E&2d 377 
(1989). 
[7] It was therefore error to instruct the jury to 
disregard evidence of Cheek's understanding that, 
within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person 
required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that 
wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such 
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might 
be. Of course, the more unreasonable the 
assertedbeliefs *204 or misunderstandings are, the more 
likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more 
than simple **612 disagreement with known legal 
duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the 
Government has carried its burden of proving 
knowledge. 
B 
[8] Cheek asserted in the trial court that he should be 
acquitted because he believed in good faith that the 
income tax law is unconstitutional as applied to him 
and thus could not legally impose any duty upon him of 
which he should have been aware. TFN91 Such a 
submission is unsound, not because *205 Cheek's 
constitutional arguments are not objectively reasonable 
or frivolous, which they surely are, but because the 
Murdock-Pomponio line of cases does not support such 
a position. Those cases construed the willfulness 
requirement in the criminal provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code to require proof of knowledge of the 
law. This was because in "our complex tax system, 
uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who 
earnestly wish to follow the law," and " '[i]t is not the 
purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of 
opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of 
reasonable care.' " United Stares v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 
346. 360-361. 93 S.Ct 2008. 2017-2018. 36 L.Ed.2d 
941 (1973) (quoting Spies v. United States. 317 U.S. 
492.496. 63 S.Ct 364.367. 87 L.Ed. 418 (1943)). 
FN9. In his opening and reply briefs and at 
oral argument, Cheek asserts that this case 
does not present the issue whether a claim of 
unconstitutionality would serve to negate 
willfulness and that we need not address the 
issue. Brief for Petitioner 13; Reply Brief for 
Petitioner 5, 11, 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 13. 
Cheek testified at trial, however, that "[i]t is 
my belief that the law is being enforced 
unconstitutionally." App. 60. He also 
produced a letter from counsel advising him 
thatw Tinally you make a valid contention ... 
that Congress1 power to tax comes from 
Article L Section 8. Clause 1 of the U.S. 
Constitution, and not from the Sixteenth 
Amendment and that the [latter], construed 
with Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3. never 
authorized a tax on wages and salaries, but 
only on gain and profit." Id., at 57. We note 
also that the jury asked for "the portion [of the 
transcript] wherein Mr. Cheek stated he was 
attempting to test the constitutionality of the 
income tax laws," Tr. 1704, and that the trial 
judge later instructed the jury that an opinion 
that the tax laws violate a person's 
constitutional rights does not constitute a 
good-faith misunderstanding of the law. We 
also note that at oral argument Cheek's 
counsel observed that "personal belief that a 
known statute is unconstitutional smacks of 
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knowledge with existing law, but 
disagreement with it." Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. 
He also opined: 
"If the person believes as a personal belief that 
known-law known to them [sic] is 
unconstitutional, I submit that that would not 
be a defense, because what the person is really 
saying is I know what the law is, for 
constitutional reasons I have made my own 
determination that it is invalid. I am not 
suggesting that that is a defense. 
"However, if the person was told by a lawyer 
or by an accountant erroneously that the 
statute is unconstitutional, and it's my 
professional advice to you that you don't have 
to follow it, then you have got a little different 
situation. This is not that case." Id., at 6. 
Given this posture of the case, we perceive no 
reason not to address the significance of 
Cheek's constitutional claims to the issue of 
willfulness. 
Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are 
unconstitutional are submissions of a different order. 
fFNlO] They do not arise from innocent mistakes 
caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at 
issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that 
those provisions are invalid **613 and unenforceable. 
*206 Thus in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years, 
but after attending various seminars and based on his 
own study, he concluded that the income tax laws could 
not constitutionally require him to pay a tax. 
FN10. In United Scares v. Murdoch, 290 U.S. 
389, 54 S.Ct. 223. 78 LJE& 381 (1933). 
discussed supra, at 609-610, the defendant 
Murdock was summoned to appear before a 
revenue agent for examination. Questions 
were put to him, which he refused to answer 
for fear of self-incrimination under state law. 
He was indicted for refusing to give 
testimony and supply information contrary to 
the pertinent provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code. This Court affirmed the 
reversal of Murdock's conviction, holding that 
the trial court erred in refusing to give an 
instruction directing the jury to consider 
Murdock's asserted claim of a good-faith, 
actual belief that because of the Fifth 
Amendment he was privileged not to answer 
the questions put to him. It is thus the case 
that Murdock's asserted belief was grounded 
in the Constitution, but it was a claim of 
privilege not to answer, not a claim that any 
provision of the tax laws were 
unconstitutional, and not a claim for which the 
tax laws provided procedures to entertain and 
resolve. Cheek's position at trial, in contrast, 
was that the tax laws were unconstitutional as 
applied to him. 
We do not believe that Congress contemplated that 
such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, 
could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the 
Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the 
mechanisms provided by Congress to present his claims 
of invalidity to the courts and to abide by their 
decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, from year to 
year, was free to pay the tax that the law purported to 
require, file for a refund and, if denied, present his 
claims of invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to the 
courts. See 26U.S.C. 5 7422. Also, without paying the 
tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies 
in the Tax Court, § 6213, with the right to appeal to a 
higher court if unsuccessful. § 7482(a)(1). Cheek 
took neither course in some years, and when he did was 
unwilling to accept the outcome. As we see it, he is in 
no position to claim that his good-faith belief about the 
validity of the Internal Revenue Code negates 
willfulness or provides a defense to criminal 
prosecution under S§ 7201 and 7203. Of course, 
Cheek was free in this very case to present his claims of 
invalidity and have them adjudicated, but like 
defendants in criminal cases in other contexts, who 
"willfully" refuse to comply with the duties placed upon 
them by the law, he must take the risk of being wrong. 
We thus hold that in a case like this, a defendant's 
views about the validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant 
to the issue of willfulness and need not be heard by the 
jury, and, if they are, an instruction to disregard them 
would be proper. For this purpose, it makes no 
difference whether the claims of invalidity are frivolous 
or have substance. It was therefore not error in this 
case for the District Judge to instruct the jury not to 
consider Cheek's claims that the tax laws were 
unconstitutional. However, it was error for the court to 
instruct *207 the jury that petitioner's asserted beliefs 
that wages are not income and that he was not a 
taxpayer within the meaning of the Internal Revenue 
Code should not be considered by the jury in 
determining whether Cheek had acted willfully. [FN 111 
FN11. Cheek argues that applying to him the 
Court of Appeals' standard of objective 
reasonableness violates his rights under the 
First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the 
Constitution. Since we have invalidated the 
challenged standard on statutory grounds, we 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Paae 9 
need not address these submissions 
IV 
For the reasons set forth in the opimon above, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opimon. 
// is so ordered 
Justice SOUTER took no part m the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
Justice SCAL1A, concurring m the judgment. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court because our 
cases have consistently held that the failure to pay a tax 
in the good-faith belief that it is not legally owing is not 
"willful" I do not jom the Court's opimon because I 
db not agree with the test for willfulness that it directs 
the Court of Appeals to apply on remand. 
As the Court acknowledges, our opinions from the 
1930's to the 1970's have interpreted the word 
"willfully" in the criminal tax statutes as requiring the 
"bad purpose" or "evil motive" of "intentionally] 
violating] a known legal duty." See, eg, United 
States v Pomponio. 429 U S. 10. 12, 97 S.Ct. 22. 23. 
50L.Ed.2dl2(1976): United States v Murdock 290 
U.S. 389.394-395.54 S.Ct 223.225-226.78 L.Ed. 381 
(1933). It seems to me that today's opimon squarely 
reverses that long-established statutory construction 
**614 when it says that a good-faith erroneous belief m 
the unconstitutionality of a tax law is no defense. It is 
quite impossible to say that a statute which *208 one 
believes unconstitutional represents a "known legal 
duty." See Mar bury v Madison, 1 Cranch 137. 
177-178. 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). 
Although the facts of the present case involve 
erroneous reliance upon the Constitution m ignoring the 
otherwise "known legal duty" imposed by the tax 
statutes, the Court's new interpretation applies also to 
erroneous reliance upon a tax statute in ignoring the 
otherwise "known legal duty" of a regulation, and to 
erroneous reliance upon a regulation m ignoring the 
otherwise "known legal duty" of a tax assessment. 
These situations as well meet the opmion's crucial test 
of "reveal[ing] full knowledge of the provisions at issue 
and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those 
provisions are invalid and unenforceable," ante, at 
612-613 There is, moreover, no rational basis for 
saying that a "willful" violation is established by full 
knowledge of a statutory requirement, but is not 
established by full knowledge of a requirement 
explicitly imposed by regulation or order Thus, 
today's opinion works a revolution in past practice, 
subjecting to criminal penalties taxpayers who do not 
comply with Treasury Regulations that are in their view 
contrary to the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury 
Rulmgs that are in then* view contrary to the 
regulations, and even IRS auditor pronouncements that 
are m their view contrary to Treasury Rulmgs. The 
law already provides considerable incentive for 
taxpayers to be careful in ignoring any official assertion 
of tax liability, smce it contains civil penalties that 
apply even m the event of a good-faith mistake, see, 
e g, 26US.C. SS6651. 6653. To impose in addition 
criminal penalties for misinterpretation of such a 
complex body of law is a startling innovation mdeed. 
I find it impossible to understand how one can derive 
from the lonesome word "willfully" the proposition 
that belief in the nonexistence of a textual prohibition 
excuses liability, but belief m the invalidity (le, the 
legal nonexistence) of a textual prohibition does not. 
One may say, as the law does *209 m many contexts, 
that "willfully" refers to consciousness of the act but 
not to consciousness that the act is unlawful. See, e g, 
American Surety Co of New York v Sullivan, 7 F 2d 
605.606 (CA2 1925) (L. Hand, J.); cf. UnitedStates v 
International Minerals A Chemical Corp.. 402 U S 
558. 563-565. 91 S.Ct 1697. 1700-1702. 29 L.Ed2d 
178(1971). Or alternatively, one may say, as we have 
said until today with respect to the tax statutes, that 
"willfully" refers to consciousness of both the act and 
its illegality. But it seems to me impossible to say that 
the word refers to consciousness that some legal text 
exists, without consciousness that that legal text is 
binding, i.e, with the good-faith belief that it is not a 
valid law. Perhaps such a test for criminal liability 
would make sense (though in a field as complicated as 
federal tax law, I doubt it), but some text other than the 
mere word "willfully" would have to be employed to 
describe it—and that textis not ours to write. 
Because today's opimon abandons clear and 
longstanding precedent to impose criminal liability 
where taxpayers have had no reason to expect it, 
because the new contours of criminal liability have no 
basis in the statutory text and because I strongly 
suspect that those new contours make no sense even as 
a policy matter, I concur only m the judgment of the 
Court. 
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice 
MARSHALL joins, dissentmg 
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It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not 
with "the complexity of the tax laws," ante, at 609, but 
with the income tax law in its most elementary and 
basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages 
income? 
The Court acknowledges that the conclusively 
established standard for willfulness under the applicable 
statutes is the " Voluntary, **615 intentional violation 
of a known legal duty.' " Ante, at 610. See United 
States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 346. 360. 93 S.Ct. 2008. 
2017. 36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973). and United States v. 
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 12.97S.Ct.22.23.50L.Ed.2d 
12(1976). That being so, it is incomprehensible to me 
how, in this day, more than 70 years after the institution 
of our *210 present federal income tax system with the 
passage of the Income Tax Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166, 
any taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his 
defense to charges of statutory willfulness the 
proposition that the wage he receives for his labor is not 
income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and 
advises the gullible to resist income tax collections. 
One might note in passing that this particular taxpayer, 
after all, was a licensed pilot for one of our major 
commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at 
least minimum intellectual competence. 
The District Court's instruction that an objectively 
reasonable and good-faith misunderstanding of the law 
negates willfulness lends further, rather than less, 
protection to this defendant, for it adds an additional 
hurdle for the prosecution to overcome. Petitioner 
should be grateful for this further protection, rather than 
be opposed to it. 
This Court's opinion today, I fear, will encourage 
taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in the 
hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. If that 
ensues, I suspect we have gone beyond the limits of 
common sense. 
While I may not agree with every word the Court of 
Appeals has enunciated in its opinion, I would affirm its 
judgment in this case. I therefore dissent. 
I l l S.Ct. 604, 498 U.S. 192, 112 L.Ed.2d 617, 59 
USLW 4049, 67 A.F.T.R.2d 91-344, 91-1 USTC P 
50,012 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Addendum D 
XMtTRUCTXO* MO._ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith of Tax 
Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign, en Verify a Tax: Re ti in i :i n 
that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every 
one of the foil Loving elements: 
' 1 
of Utah, Thomas Smith; 
2 Intentionally or wi llfully evaded; 
he 
4 Failed, to make render, sign, or verify any return or to 
rendered, signed, ox verified any false or fraudulent return of" 
statement, or he supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign 
or Verify a Tax Return, in Count I of the Amended Information 
w i si It: f ,:l i i :!, I: ; I Il  ti O i it I: h iiii 11 II m m t II i a 111 II „ 
evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt all mf the elements 
of Tax Evasion Failure to Make, Render Sign or Verify a Tax 
Pf't' i ii1 „ I ' I "I (" 1 1 nense„ 
INSTRUCTION MO, 3*^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith, of Tax 
Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax, in Count II of the Amended 
Information, you must find from the evidence that the State has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the 
following elements: 
1. On or before April 15, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, Thomas Smith; 
2. Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
3. To evade or defeat any applicable tax or requirement of 
Title 59 or the payment thereof due on his income earned in 1995. 
If the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax, 
in Count II of the Amended Information, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. On the other hand, if the evidence establishes beyond 
a reasonable doubt all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful 
Evasion of Income Tax, you must find the defendant guilty of the 
offense. 
IMSTRUCTIOM MO. £ £ 
Utah Code, Section 76- 2-1 03, states: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully u i th 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of 
his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the result, 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when 
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or Maliciously, with respect t(:i 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of 
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such 
a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint, 
JURY INSTRUCTION 
The defendant has introduced evidence of advice he heard given by speakers at 
meetings, tape recorded lectures, essays, pamphlets, court opinions, and other material 
that he testified he relied on in concluding that he was not a person required to file an 
income tax return for 1995. This evidence has bean admitted solely for the purpose of 
aiding you in determining whether or not the defendant's failure to timely file a tax return 
for 1995 was knowing and willful and you should not consider it for any other purpose. 
You are not to consider this evidence as containing any law that you are to apply in 
reaching your verdicts, because all of the law applicable to this case is set forth in these 
instructions. 
INSTRUCTION NO. >?Ar 
! ! :: i :i i t h i s t r i i : ' t e :i tl: :i at t l le a< it: i: i:i ssioi i :: f defei idai it s 
Exhibit #23 A W is not, entered into evidence for any substantive 
value but tor .., limitec purpose of showing the defendant's 
state of mind on or about January 1, 1995 to April 16, i^w. 
Addendum E 
j T A H C O U R T OF APPEALS 
----00O00----
State ?f Utah 
Plaint: 11 » >n I -4 (. i. 1 I,Jl , 
v 
l'i] '""'"""is S m i t.h, 
Defendaut dji'.;J Appe 11 di11, 
'-DER 
CasM in 101 Ofll" 
-CA 
I h i s matter is before the court on a motion to allow 
A ppellant to file his own pro se brief in addition to, and 
separate from, the brief filed on his behalf by his counsel :f 
record, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA). 
As A p p e n a n t » s counsel of record in this court, LDA i s 
obligated to be an active advocate in behalf the client and 
support the client's appeal to the best of 'its ability. See 
State v. Wells. 2000 UT App 304, 14, 13 P.3d 1056 (citing 3cate 
v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1981)), If Appellant wishes 
to raise issues that LDA believes are meritless or otherwise 
unsupported, LDA should incorporate those issues into its brief 
under the guidelines of Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738 (1967! 
and State v. Clayton. 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). This procedure 
allows the court to fully evaluate all of Appellant's issues on 
appeal in the most effective and efficient format. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the mo! J " i 
t his own, pro se brief is denied. 
DATED r n i - t<jun <lay ul, R|,JI I J, lum, 
FOR THE COURT: 
I I "I < \ p p e J I :H»I I O 
Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on April 24, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
LINDA M. JONES 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated this April 24, 2002. 
iy Clerk 
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76-3-201. Definitions - Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution0 means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4Xc). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim'* does not include any copartieipaiit in the defendants 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1991, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred bv law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty, 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence, 
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
denned in Subsection (lXe). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4XO and (4Xd). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as denned in 
Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4Xc). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
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(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5XaXi) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant ia transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5XcXi) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offens* 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
ii) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and; 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 60 
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of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1963, 76-3-201, e n a c t e d by L. 
1973, c h . 196, § 76-3 201; 1979, c h . 69, § 1; 
t 961 , ch . 59, § 1; 1963, ch . 8 6 , 5 1 ; 1963, ch . 
88, | 3; 1964, c h . 16, $ 1; 1966, ch . 156, § 1; 
1967, ch . 107, § 1; 1990, ch . 81 ,9 l ; 1 9 9 2 , c h . 
143, ft 1; 1903, c h . 17, ft 1; 1994, c h . 13, ft 19; 
!996, ch . I l l , ft 1; 1995, c h . 117, ft 1; 1995, 
ch. 301, ft 1; 1995, c h . 337, ft 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), ch . 10, ft 1; 1996, c h . 40, ft 1; 1996, ch . 
79, ft 90; 1996, c h . 241, ftft 2 , 3 ; 1996, c h . 149, 
f 1; 1999, ch . 270, ft 15. 
Amendment No te s . — The 1995 amend 
meat by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added 
"or for conduct for which the defendant hem 
agreed to make restitution as par t of a plea 
agreement* and made a related change in Sub-
section UXaMi). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1996, inserted "the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection 
(lXd), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "per-
son convicted" in Subsection (2), and added 
Subsections (4XaXiii) and (4XdXiii). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in 
Subsection (4Xc)" a t the end of Subsection 
UXd); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the cri-
teria and procedures for ordering restitution; 
added Subsection (8); and made several stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2Kg), redes-
ignated former Subsection (2Xg) as Subsection 
2Xh), and deleted former Subsection (7XO, 
requiring sentencing to the aggravated manda-
tory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to 
children during the commission of child kid-
napping or various listed child sexual assaults. 
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for 
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2Xg). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
(2Xg), which read: "on or after April 29,1996, to 
imprisonment a t not less than five years and 
which may be for life for an offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Par t 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 
•nd 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-
section (2Xh) as Subsection (2Kg); deleted 
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing 
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing 
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7» 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective 
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) subst i tuted 
"removal or disqualification from" for "removal 
from or disqualification of" and in Subsection 
(4XaXi) added "Section" before "77-37-2 " 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241 , §§ 2 and I 
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection 
(4XaXvii) and (4XdXiv). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998 
in Subsection (4XaXi) substituted "Subsection 
(lXe)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted ' and 
family member has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the 
style of the internal references in Subsections 
(5XcXi), (5XcXii), and (8Xc). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999 
in Subsection (6Xe), substituted "aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation 
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission" 
for "Commission on Criminal and Juveni le J u s 
tice" and made stylistic changes. 
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — Laws 1995, ch 301, 
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch 117 to 
Subsection (4XaXiii) shall merge into this set 
tion, as amended by ch. 301, a s Subsection 
(4XaXvi). 
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1, 1995 
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amend 
ment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29, 
1996. 
Cross -Refe rences , — Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63 25a 101 et 
seq. 
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq 
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 e t seq 
Restitution as condition of probation, § 
18-1. 
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule 
22, R Crim.P. 
Special release from city or county jail , pur 
poses, conditions and limitations, § 77 19-3 et 
seq. 
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule, 
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx G. 
77-38a-302. Restitution criteria. 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided 
in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(12) and in determining 
whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and 
procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitu-
tion and court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a 
victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be deter-
mined as provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate 
under this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the 
court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criqunal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical or mental health care, including 
nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method 
of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(v) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tions (5Xa) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make 
restitution inappropriate, 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. It**, 77-48*401, enacted by became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant to 
U 1M1, cau 1*7, | ft. Utah Const.. Art. VI, Sec. 26. 
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May 2, 2001 
Adult Probation and Parole 
Attn: Frank Hasy 
Court Services Unit 
38 West Fremont Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: State v. Thomas Smith; Case No. 91920225 
Dear Sir. 
As a supplement to the earlier letter in this case, the lead investigator in this case, Dorothy 
Akins, reports that the criminal investigation unit's calculation with respect to the amount 
of taxes, penalty and interest owed by this defendant - for 1995 alone - was $7,162,64, as 
of April 9, 2001 
You should know that the evidence in this case demonstrated that this defendant has not 
filed since approximately 1988 and thus his course of conduct losses would be, and are, 
tremendously higher than the aforementioned figure. 
If you have any specific questions in this regard, please feel free to contact Ms. Akins at 
297-3871. 
Again, thank you for your attention to this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact this 
office with any questions. 
Sntihl hom»s2ndt fek»tf» wp* 
Sftcerely, 
> 
ark W. Baer 
[Assistant Attorney General 
160 &AI.T 300 SOUTH 6TH F I O O A • P O Box 140814 • SAL I LAKE CITY, UTAH 04114-0014 * TEL. (001) 300-0199 • TAX. ($01) 366-0242 
Rule 2. Time. 
(a) In computing any period of time, the day of the act or event from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day 
of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, 
or a legal holiday. When a period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 11 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall not be 
included in the computation. 
(b) When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may, at any time in its discretion: 
(1) with or without motion or notice, order the period enlarged if request 
therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order; or 
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period, permit the 
act to be done if there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to act; but the 
court may not extend the time for taking any action under the rules applying 
to a judgment of acquittal, new trial, arrest of judgment and appeal, unless 
otherwise provided in these rules. 
(c) A written motion other than one that may be heard ex parte and notice 
of the hearing thereof shall be served not later than five days before the time 
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by rule or order of 
the court. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served 
with the motion and opposing affidavits may be served not less than one day 
before the hearing unless the court permits them to be served at a later time. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment substituted "11 days* for "seven days" in 
the last sentence in Subdivision (a). 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new tnal in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the applica-
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (aXD, (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, FRCP. 
Croee References. — Harmless error not 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under 
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
0f the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
glinllarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is 
filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of 
Appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no 
effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time 
measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion 
as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed 
by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed 
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry 
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined in 
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (0, the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice 
of appeal. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- motions under Rule 26 from the second sen-
ment added Subdivision (f). tence in Subdivision (b). 
The 1999 amendment deleted provisions for 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THOMAS H. SMITH 
DOB: 01/16/43 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO CLARIFY 
SENTENCING ORDER 
Criminal No. 011902002 TS 
JL^ 
COMES NOW, the State of Utah, by and through Mark W. Baer, Assistant Attorney 
General and hereby request that the Court in the above cited case clarify the Sentence, 
Judgment, Commitment Order entered in the above cited case. In support thereof, the State 
notes as follows: 
1. On or about September 7,2001, the defendant in this case was sentenced on two 
tax fraud convictions arising out of an earlier trial on those charges. See Judgment/Sentence 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
3. No restitution amount appears in the Judgment/Sentence in this case. 
2. However; as part of the sentencing request, the State had asked for a criminal 
restitution order in the minimum amount of $6,105.94, which amount represents the amount 
that the defendant owed as of the investigation of his case in August, 1999.The State renews 
that request at this time and asked that it be memorialized as part of the record in this case. 
3. In addition, the Judgment specifically requires the defendant to file returns "for all 
years requested" and that the defendant must "make any future returns." However, the Order 
does not specifically state the previous years nor that the defendant must file legitimate 
returns with supporting documentation. 
4. Notwithstanding the language pointed out in paragraph 3 above, since the time of 
sentencing, officials at the Utah State Tax Commission have reported that Mr. Smith has 
already stated that he will not so file previous year returns. 
5. In light of the state of the Judgment/Sentence and the defendant's posture in this 
case, the State feels it is now imperative that this Court enter a very specific Order in these 
regards. Even discounting the reports from the Tax Commission, the specification of the 
Court's previous orders in this regard do not change anything previously ordered by the Court. 
6. Therefore the State requests that this Court enter a further Order which would further 
clarify and specify the Order and Judgment already ordered in this case that the defendant: 
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present; 
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of the defendant; 
2 
(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation with such returns; 
(4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, as of August, 1999, for purposes of this 
criminal case only; howeverthis noted amount does not bind the Utah State Tax Commission, 
and further only related to tax year 1995. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
MarklW. Baer " • 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Ron Fujino 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Stand-By Counsel for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas H. Smith 
1301 WHBR 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS HOWARD SMITH, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991920225 FS 
Judge: RAYMOND S. UNO 
Date: September 7, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD S FUJINO 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 16, 1943 
Video 
Tape Number: 1:08 
CHARGES 
1. TAX EVASION - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
2. TAX EVASION - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2001 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
Case No: 991920225 
Date: Sep 07, 2001 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts are to run concurrent. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 









Total Fine: $3500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $1608.11 
Total Principal Due: $3500.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 3500.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to cooperate with the Tax Commission and file returns 
for all years requested. 
Defendant is to make any future tax filings. 
Defendant is to complete 500 hours community service doing service 
approved by APPD. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $3500 which includes the surcharge. 
Page 2 
Case No: 991920225 
Date: Sep 07, 2001 
A review hearing is set for March 15, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. 
Defendant is to keep the State informed of his address at all 
times. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/15/2002 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 




In compliance with the Americans with Piaabili€S^^^jhtj^Kdividuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary ccflflmunicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days 
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is 
(801)238-7300. 
NWMSTIICTCOUir 
Third Judicial District 
By: MARK W. BAER #5440 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
Attorney For The State of Utah 
Heber Wells Building 
PMB 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)366-0199 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




The defendant is hereby Ordered as follows in addition to anything already 
ordered in this case: 
(1) File all past Utah State returns from 1990 to present; 
(2) That the filings must account for income and expenses of the defendant; 
(3) That the defendant must present supporting documentation with such returns; 
ORDER 
Criminal No. 011002002 TS 
5 
(4) That Restitution is hereby set at $6,105.94, for purposes of this criminal case only, 
but that this amount does not bind the Utah State Tax Commission, and further only related 
to tax year 1995. 
DONE IN COURT this ^ day of ^ y / b 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
to the following: 
Ron Fujino 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Stand-By Counsel for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Thomas H. Smith 
1301 WHBR 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Mark W. Baer 
Assistant Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
PMB 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Thomas Smith 
1301 WH6R 
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Case No. 991920225 
Objection to Proposed Order 
Defendant, Thomas Smith, hereby responds, objects to and moves the Court to 
summarily deny the Plaintiffs proposed order on grounds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to 
grant the relief requested (no hearing is needed) and sets forth his reasons below. 
FACTS 
1. Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a third degree felony for the year 
1995. 
2. Defendant was charged with one count of tax evasion a second degree felony for the 
year 1995. 
3. Defendant was not charged with any tax crime whatsoever for any year other than 1995. 
4. Defendant's conviction was only for the year 1995 and for no other year. 
Objictlon to ordtr 
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5. No evidence or testimony was presented at trial regarding any filing requirement for any 
year other than 1995, nor was the jury asked to determine a filing requirement for any 
year other than 1995. 
6. Therefore, there was no determination regarding any filing requirement for any year 
other than 1995. 
7. Plaintiff seeks an summary order requiring Defendant to file tax returns for years other 
than the year 1995. 
DISCUSSION 
The only year at issue in the instant matter is 1995. Plaintiff had more than ample 
opportunity to bring forth charges that Defendant had a filing requirement for years other than 
1995 and to set forth the bets on which Plaintiff believed that Defendant was required to file. 
Plaintiff did not bring forth such charges, nor did Plaintiff set forth such bets at trial. 
Therefore, Plaintiff is estopped from bringing forth such request as a summary proceeding and 
the Court is estopped from granting such request. Further, because such facts are not before 
the Court, the Court lacks subject matter and in personum jurisdiction over such matters. 
By making the request that the Court order Defendant to file such returns for years other 
than 1995, Plaintiff is asking the Court to relieve Plaintiff of its requirement to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendant is required to file for a year other than 1995. The Court lacks 
jurisdiction to make such an order in the absence of a determination by a trier of fact that such 
Objection to order 
Case No 991920225 
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returns are required. 
The most important issues established in the instant matter are that whether or not the 
Defendant is required to file a tax return and pay a tax is an issue of fact not an issue of law. 
To determine issues of fact requires a trial at which plaintiff sets forth the evidence and 
testimony and a trier of fact makes a determination on the basis of the facts set forth, and that 
failure to file a tax return and pay a tax is not a civil matter, but, is a criminal matter which 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Plaintiff, by not bringing a charge of failing 
to file and pay for years other than 1995 has forfeited its right to require Defendant to file and 
pay for years other than 1995. 
Not withstanding such requirement, Plaintiff seeks to circumvent Defendant's right to 
due process and to have a trier of fact make a determination that Defendant is required to file 
for years other than 1995, by asking the Court to summarily order the Defendant to file tax 
returns for years other than that which the Defendant stands convected of. If the Court has 
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file for years other than 1995, then the Court 
had jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file for 1995 and no trial would have been 
necessary. The Court has no such authority. 
Years ago the State of Utah issued a Writ of Mandate to individuals that the Tax 
Commission fett should file tax returns (a civH summary proceeding requiring a lower civil 
evidentiary requirement). In this process the court would summarily order the individual to file 
Objection to order 
C A M No 991920225 
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and jail him/her for contempt if such return was not filed. This procedure was found to be 
defective, in that it constituted a denial of the individuals right to due process, because as 
established by the instant matter failure to file is a criminal matter. It cannot be determined on 
the basis of a civil proceeding and the lower civil evidentiary requirement. Nor, can it be 
determined on the basis of a summary proceeding in the absence of a trial. The determination 
of the requirement to file is highly fact sensitive. Since the requirement to file is criminal 
proceeding, it requires a criminal adjudication and a criminal evidentiary requirement. As 
stated above the Defendant is not charged with nor has the Defendant been found beyond a 
reasonable doubt, by a trier of fact, to be required to file for any year other than 1995. In the 
absence of such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a trier of tact, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to summarily order the Defendant to file returns for any year other than 1995. 
Therefore, numbers 1,2,3, must be denied for lack jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Annotated 59-7-517(2) requires that before any proceeding against a 
taxpayer is commenced the taxpayer must be noticed. The Court should take judicial notice 
that prior to trial no notice of a tax due was sent to Defendant, nor was any exhibit or testimony 
presented to the jury that a notice was sent. The attached Notice of Deficiency, dated 
September 20,2001, is the first notice the Defendant has received from the Tax Commission 
regarding taxes due for 1995. Thus the instant case was commenced in violation of Title 59-7-
517(2) and the Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or 
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to order the Defendant to do anything. Pursuant to the attached Notice of Deficiency the Court 
lacks jurisdiction to order the Defendant to file for the year 1995 because such order would 
circumvent the Defendants due process rights to appeal the deficiency as noted on the 
attached Notice of Deficiency accordingly. 
As to item number 4, the aforesaid Notice of Deficiency alleges a deficiency of 
$8,004.39 for the year 1995. The Court will note that said Deficiency notices the Defendant 
that he has the right to 1) Request a Division Conference or 2) to file a Petition for 
Redetermination within 30 days of the mailing date of this letter. If the Court were to grant the 
proposed order as to item number 4 such order would circumvent and deny Defendant his 
appeal rights as granted by instruction number 2 on the Deficiency Notice. Further, such order 
would negate the Notice of Deficiency in its entirety and the Defendant's right to due process 
under the terms and conditions of the Notice of Deficiency. Additionally, the issuance of the 
attached Notice of Deficiency takes jurisdiction to determine the amount of tax due away from 
this Court and places it squarely within the jurisdiction of State Tax Commission appeals 
division. 
Thus, as shown above the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the proposed order and/or 
to proceed or to enforce any judgment of guilty and/or to order the Defendant to do anything 
and must therefore and can SUMMARILY deny the proposed order in its entirety and no 
hearing is needed. 
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Dated September 26,2001 
/s/ Thomas Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing by fax on the following: 
Third District Court; Mark W. Bear Assistant Attorney General, 160 E. 300 S. 6th Floor, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114; Ron Fujino, 424 E. 500 S. Ste 300, Salt Lake City, UT, 84111. 
Dated: September 26,2001 
Is/ Thomas Smith 
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UTAH STATE TAX COMMSSIOIt 
NOTICE OF AUDIT CHANGE C0NTINUE0 
DO ¥Q? HAIL THIS BLAMK COUPON. 
BAIL 1H THE COtfPOH CONTAINING 
PSEPRIHTBB ACCOUNT, FILIKG PERIOD 
AKD AftOttH? OK KEVEKSE S I D E . 
S6PTWER3&\ 200! 
SOTWOW HHICF OF ESTWHED 2MCQME TAX 
TNOWS i W\k SMITH 
1301 M R 
VEflWL 3T 84078 
PAY9CKT QUE DATE: OCTOK* 22, 2001 
TO W E : INCOME 
SOCIAt SECURITY MJWW: S29-W-IM9 
TAX YttR: 1996 
ICH; aB*991*48Q« 
If you insfe to ifiou1r# abort title jntturn pleest do so vttfrfn 30 o*ys of the <kt* of this notice, or you My ttle * correct 
return. Pttese note ttat • prapt response u needed in order to protect your opeel nohts. These Jpptet rtojts ere 
cutlinedontbe beck of this notice. 
Additional pennies end imerett w in be assessed i f pe*ent is not received by the "pedant due1" <tet« shown eoove. 
Additional penalty of ten percent of the tddU1ontl tex a * or So jhicheuer is erecter * m t * essessed if peynent is not 
received by tne "peyeent 4 * " a t * sftoun above. PLEASE WT YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMKR OH YOUR CHECx. For pipent 
^nfcmetlen contact the Objection division by celling (aDi) 297-7703 
4JDITJN* DIVISION 
fkcky McKerae CPA 
ftat-297-Mt! 
Qbjtction to onjtf 
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r , i»i i ,i#frr ,M#iir ,4Mir itr ,MMiMiMii 
o6zo~»£i*9 i.n AJJO a*vn nvs 
M 0S6 I H OiZ 
NOtSSfirMWOO XVX 3XVJLS MVXH 
CHVa1 1 N O O W V b J 3 A M 3 S W W T N iNnooav M*>kMt Mat* . * * m*^ »9n l * f l w < 
^ o xEfflxuy^ AS 3HQ l * 3 * A V d 
A 3 N 3 0 U 9 Q rfO 3 9 U O N AtfOXTUVJ,* 
. 0 0 * * 3 * 3 < ^ xVx 
rtATir?oiiY NOTICE o* DtmcitMcn 
AtiacJM>4 « r t clie r*a4iiia> af lac fan C « i M m M « i i * l u o a * •s«*Maa*4»a a f jr«ur rataro* o» rac«ml». It' > « * t M « . ¥Ow may vftaat • n v i a t t >« i « e 
taunaatatatv fnrytaa <aa aatjciaocv u t t S M U i m . T V ta«ei«4t «a—>-a m tfcc »u*cba4 aatfii r«fwt« t* catcaJct** thwMftt t>ur 4aw M H J K W W J . ff U M * -mint 
r*<*l%m»i la « ««MMtoi M M * yw« i p n wiu* ilMr rafiarv, 9c Itfnaur aaiiua, <m ytmr part u 
! f van u» aot «$* • * . y«u stay • • ? * • ! 
fcUH j a w pat iuaa M ts« ^. 
Y a a ».«> maaa*< * Dtv*»ina> C # a f t * a * 
« • « • w i l l toe cooaanaa «•> v i Inform*) 
w t m I k * AaaUMa* D t f a t i a * in- »a at t<m u» c lar i fy • « • * « « « « » tfc* t««aat » * * * * • * » # » « <»v» iv«* . 
3 1 / jr«« «•» » r t M N i * Oiv iv iMt Camsuwtm m M W w t f « M M i i w a<w tm*l*n tfeat m w r . « w l y* **m% ta aarua* yaar aapaai '**>««*, »<««* m» 
• J»«<fU«*a «ar t a « * t « r a » i R * t i + a » - 4 U M » JO amy* •» »•» a a u t t a * a**a of tate fawar •» **«<««• j ra * apaa* : *>*#*>* w » v cha taw A «opy a< U M * St* 
N<jtftea atam » • «UaMAMi t * your PattUaa fa* I t K u W H U w u i w Taa Tan C M M M M M * * M IN» jnwlhwrny M» **>»4«*r J I I W >«•*«»«• »« « «~ »•« <»«••* -^sfci 
l i W i o w itw m00twy't « * • *4»<U««««M( • « tftUt IMn««M>. 
«. t«lt«Bv> tint rwr<l«Ml»f ten lnv»lk>*a. UM: period of »1 tfpd l i « » t i H / . U » » p t « r i t u i , ami (%« « « I X U I nf w* of s«« I«MM. U> «t>iHMC Us 
A i f t t l w l * • #ui«MM*a * f U M taau «u»« raa*aa» imm tat i*« *•«*» fat raliaf or ac«t»« «aa»tn io»a» M M aanary 
«. )««»*•** • w m n a v y «< M»aw»caa> t W •«***«r»ua» •mf.wl upun. 
/ laOMatt >aa»l mwh/otixy, jmri*dutiem^ a»4iov rule viMftat aiirra) aa^ac; » » p w ut ra<iajii»d. 
>. t i tcioa* « K U W M U «r tiM r«i*«r « i «*«kw#* «*>*•/»} faMO win. aa^aay. 
it latflaaK l a * —m»* au4 a«laV«aja> af «»l ) i a f * a i «• i r t w n a «apy al ilw •mutton lot Ptafcammaaifeai u aaittK »*ai 
I K * *•&>»«««» r«« * < « n * m i * M M « a>aa« a * tta^ma Uy um >v%»ia>w>t. aaa t a c m a i ihr r««* i fna«r * ift^arnwHar a a i a o r . 
Tf >*«<* r»fc» H a ^ f ( u > « H R W«a*<»riw»—.«•«>», dw T * * C a M M t M t n w / U r •»»• •< • » * » «a AiMww ie 'T«t4*4««> fur «aat>t«rfataa(i«a «o «po?i*a you o« ih» • • 
a/ m «Jk<«tiaM * a a ta« faa%» U mtta» ufarn fim tit* *mr»n«it>*« latial ' (P«r*a»*«t H> U t a * Coac A a a a ^ - ^ * a - 3 
U«t«*» j*n» it>« » a**iUaav tor l U a a — a r t a M i w A» * u « r i M «a«r*« «»tk*iia OM» x««i«»l»aa a * <U>*. itk«<k aaauaar? n»ou««. • • » eaa*^taor « f inal •avcaraea; 
»tii«M*« t«r ftaaajatmraajtun 4* ao* f t l a * or f a l l aaytaam *t a«t iaca«««4 wt»«ti» JO 4a^r». .yoar «a*« w i l l toe r*t««t*4 u> Uw C<*IW<xma% IfavKio4i l b * ) 
wrtact U M aaaaM uut «ai'k<sia<y. *m* h» aa^u jaa aan — jraa tew apaaimi iatatas* «a4 a flvwaaymani awa*Hy « ' »C )^*«r»»» m 4"K>. * *»ck#v» / :« tfc« «r 
aavkuaivt u» Utaa C*»c Amm * * - l - 4 0 1 . aa. ^ ^ 
U / « « ! 
YVMt P*.0**f>T RESFOMSX IS MCEIMR23 IN OROXll TO •ffcOTECT Y O U l APPEAL ftlOHTa. 
4 . ptaaar r«4ar u> ika « M I U or »«ati««r •oei««*ri»d < M tto« rvvaria »•<* af i l u * « O < J ^ 
t l ya» aaa* an aiaiiajiiaiiaaiimi aaaar UM- Amaru 
i * n * trarlUaa * *y» Fat * tnmpumtm 
. w«ta Oia»totlli»ar Aat. s»u«a«« t a * Ta« C o i u i m a n * a< ( a u i i » 7 - S f i t at T O D i * 7 > 3 t ! 9 » M M 
Farw> rXNAiC R« 
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UTAH f T A T f T^X COMMiSSlOp 
NOTICE Qr ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 3ETURN 
PLEASE ENTER THE AMOUNT PATO 
ON THE OTHER SIDE 
tBWVCJDF 
* 0 ; K « 0 1 T H 4 4 4 9 C * 
THOKAS * KAR'U S . * : ? * 
13fc~ WHER 
VERNAL TJT &4C7fc 
"•*r •• A*, "tn'v #*"•*-• "M>* »:^ JJ» Vtc;**cV' 
STATUTORY NOnCt Or CSTIMMSD IICCME TAX 
THDMtt ft HttiA SMITH 
1301 * « ? 
¥£RKAc UT £M07ft 
PAVf€MT OUt OATi: OCTO0C9 22. 2301 
TAX H I T : I«OMK 
SOCIAL SEOJUITV MUMKft: S2M2-444* 
TAX YtA#: 299S 
Our r«co*cto s*c*» you H»v© f»11«d to f i l e • Ut*h HfKhvldkM' ^«teo*ft tax return for %n* tax *tor nstoo asov*. irfcnw.-*cr» 
fro* yc^ e«pioy«r% the i*S, or ptr . f guvirnJMr>t«* r«canH {naicitts. you i^w© incro* taxable in utaft. "jcaor provls ens of 
UCA &3-2O-S06, tm Co*Mfttio<i h*s pno*r«4 * rvtyrr. from fftforattion w oar possesion. 




^aera"1 Adjusted 4rots tncaw-
ooo*ct*an Anoum. 
t.x«flpt<un Anourtt 
MAOJHfD P l i M6 JDtWT 
tfWQ TORN 
c, 
< A. 63 
6.66D.0Q 
3 . 0 * 2 . *7 •-**• 
u t*r t a,.
 a f >*« - ncdtw 
Ut«n XrVtoftMl 1«X 
U t t h \i*n r « x 
i AA 0U£ 
»>on» t ty Duo* 
L»M*ra*t Fro* e n - * * - 1 * « * tc «0-*2-300« 
TCTAi. out i i d n r i o m 1 ux 4 penalty * i f»t«r«t) £.004.19 






Becky \RK«n/ic CPA 
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T T 0 5 2 0 T / ' h i ^ h a Q * Q 0 a 0 / d 5 T S f c T 0 S k / r 5 f c n K t i g 5 W 2 5 / / T l / h a 
rMl! ,M tll i|M,Mlll?,lMHMll# ,M f il ,M , ,f! 
0 € C O - * € l * « 111 XJLkO 3XV" ! X T V S 
]- Of¥«f AWHOWV UULM1 
• e *oo » t 
gno x.vy<A¥c> 
tooe * « » i«ox96 
AS i n c xNai^Au^ 
AOHm&daa «to adtxoisi Attoxru>x.« 
MQISIMQ 8NI1IOIW 
or»vcf)oe« 
n a q * n * . I N O O O D V 
i t ( r » i . i r i ! . .A ~+.iuii, XI 
L 
* « * i aao « • « • N V P 
UQOfad 
XVJL 9HC0NI 
S T A T U T O H V ttOTTCl f a * O f t n C I E N C T 
AitartftaO * f « taa l»a*f*a*> iff tfca l*j« C m M M M A i U t i r • « e«Ma*aaC»ffn * • y « t f retwta* nr »»r««r<tt «> >«»«• wcrw* >»<* mmy •»*«*€* a *»»«•*» tit ( * * M 
*»iKW*Hu«iy TM>4a« t a * tfaltaaaacy I I I W W Taa tntanatt (hvwa in <fca anaaaa* «%***« cavort r* i^icuUt#«t ifer*Jtt0i iba *aw» uaiteataal I f * M audit 
r*«atia6 in K !—*%* a a * r * « aayac « t t » urn tvtawt, a» (aytfcc? M U M oa» ««air pan »% i t o m w y 
»* y*»a aa» • * • « p w , yaw aaaa- a a i r ^ l aaw»aa«» *» ttut ft4<«ia«M« * r Ua»» C*4» Aon f*>- i -JO* aanj * • • * # * J 
1 « • fotteawu* i f ^ i l pro»a*ttraa a m avai lable M yv« 
V a * m»T r « | « M t ft O i v u i a t i Coal««aa«« * u a Ufta Aaa lMla f D * v i * j o a }« aa » I W \ to Warr ty • • # s a w * «>»* ««»«» a a * p r o b H i < tav» | *a4 
3 If V « M 4a • * « waac •* *©iv*aH«» Coalataaaa ai (Jr« «* • *««#«** a a * * ax* «WWIW4 ta>«* « » I M I . aaal JMM aw** *t» &m*>m y~m ajiaaiat *«•»«%. ***» tew 
• K t U i * > i ' « ft«#aMtfa*4«*«*«Mi « 4 0 t l » %ft 4ayf •»» t k r maalfan * * » • «*» «»*»• lataar *» •«• • •«« • « * • appeal * % * « • . w*4«» U M U M » A «<r|»jr « i -•»**• t%a 
N«>«ia» a»t»i a* anaafeaa) i » ¥•>« 1%H*MN» t*» it»a>>tMw<aa*>oa. Ta# Taa O a u a i a h « c aa» w» aa t i inwy u> ttiasMh>* y««a ai«i»»«>« i f »» t* t^ni c««*«t «*^ »»n 
90 day f w j o a . • « « * rtwaaa)i « Oavisnaa C««aiaraaaa i» i 
*T M»W> faftuaa> raaaHs. iNNai a t*%m* m aaMaa tt«a» «*a ' 
dif t t taaj MT «arr»c«t w» t w i i w a t «v iaa a«xiaw>. 
laaJKata O K aacacy'a tucaami w w a j a» mlmr r*f< mawaar tea <wa4iiaia< *m i k a tatnia«y 
lnaHa»*» tto» Ban*rula« w « igivaiwad. tftc a a r f d af altafavi lu iMltcy. tf arrvoeviata. Mid ia«i «aw*aa« of ta* m tfcr iiata; m 4Mrjn« <•* 
sfMUaaa»4 oa dbia aoil«a> 
faaa* ihm «v«a«y (achaa* * ««ataaa«m of rha £aat» a*d < 
InaJoac a aaaxaaavv a# •wtmitwm aaa) 
*aj4Miav^ 1MB>J *«MMiri«y. *m\m****i*m. —>atW #<*)• onavw -««a>f«a> ' < • * • ; 
iaaiutta * <t«a>«n«s« ««r t*m w«a»f ar aatMMa. i«aa>% (raaa Ua» a p a a y 
Tlw •f*«»«i«M («r R * i i » M « i M t M i aaaa* aa H I B H < *>V tlw a,aU<taww. • » • ***>•>** M M f^Miti^iaM*^ wn^ffcima u«Mtil*» 
tt you fit* » rai4iM«jk urn a a a a i a u a i a a o a a , %*• l ax Cowati—>oa w i n rasa 
«* »*» «Si«a«MM* • * * tte« raaab
 tv r«M«» Mfwa ta« iaj« j f l n n w n v v r«ii*J pu t * 
«rvO »a> Anttwvj «• PV«>U«M» «ot a^uei«ra»taa<M» tri apptiw *e»a <*f ta# a» 
> w v»«»a c*Mh> Atu* a j » « a a 5 
Vaiaa» yev fu« « a««ti4an far tTaawXiaiaaa.Pn a» Maiamaia- aia»»« w i U u a tfc* r«^«inul 3 0 Oaya. l a u SaattMory Hat*c« * r i t «nut»ti»a a i taal m r a m 
•HtJ is f l Jiv Kaa*a*#aatt>ata*ft m> a«a f i l a« nr tmi aa^aaam* t% a«>i racanaW arHata 16 4aya. »<n« «aa« artU fta rai«rt<a4 w i *a Col lat t*of» 0«va»H<a Tha 
«o4i«<u Um umimt* <•* #af*«.a»«cy« aaa m aaaiiiawa, aaaaa ya« M»» • * " * » ! « * uwaaaai asut •> aoarpayuMr»« a a t f i t y M i « a«r«M»c «r SJC wa«ca*v«t tt ua> <t 
r M i w w •<• U M i Caaa Aaw t a - t ~ * o i . « • 
YOim rxoMrr KKSM»Me is WEEDED I N onoeft TO rmortwci voirm A»i*nAt «IO^TS 
— t a d , aaaaar »aC»r ta> «*>c aaait ar ****** i«aauifta4 aa <ac ravera» » < • ai cat* aniMa 
iat«c anMtUat *«v« <«v A 
t W AQMrricaaa ari«a OiaaV«iuiaa A d . CMrtact iaa l a x O v u a t W * * «t <»Oi> 3«n-SC1l or TOX> 3f>?-3tt« Urn 
ttrwm ^ X N A J O « 
0b(6ct)0fito ordor 
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PARTS 
RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS 
77-38a-301. Restitution — Convicted defendant may be 
required to pay. 
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